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The United States electrical grid is a marvelous feat of engineering, 
with the National Academy of Engineering naming “Electrification” 
the “Greatest Engineering Achievement of the 20th Century.”1  The 
extent of the United States electrical grid infrastructure is vast, 
representing over $1 trillion in assets and 360,000 miles of 
transmission lines connecting over 6000 power plants.2  Electricity has 
been integrated into the daily lives of U.S. citizens in innumerable 
ways. 
                                                                                                                 
 1. GREATEST ENGINEERING ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE 20TH CENTURY, 
http://www.greatachievements.org (last visited Apr. 15, 2014). 
 2. INFRASTRUCTURE SEC. & ENERGY RESTORATION, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 
LARGE POWER TRANSFORMERS AND THE U.S. ELECTRIC GRID 5 (2012), available at 
http://energy.gov/oe/downloads/large-power-transformers-and-us-electric-grid-
report-june-2012. 
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While the electrical grid is undoubtedly an impressive human 
innovation worthy of great respect, it is also outdated.3  Some 
equipment that makes up the physical infrastructure has already 
passed its expected life span.4   Failing grid equipment was the cause 
of nearly twenty percent of sustained power outages from 2008 to 
2011.5  In light of the Obama Administration’s commitment to 
developing sources and distribution of renewable energy,6 some have 
called into question the ability of the aging grid to suit the demands of 
today’s society, identifying the need to improve the efficiency of 
power delivery and the incorporation of renewable energy 
technologies as necessary requisites for the electrical grid of 
tomorrow.7 
This “grid of tomorrow” will rely upon the near-instantaneous 
communication of information made possible by the Internet.  Wiring 
the antiquated grid to the Internet, however, will expose existing 
vulnerabilities and create entirely new ones.8  Recent attacks on other 
utilities around the world, as well as institutions traditionally 
perceived as being secure from cyber attacks such as banks and stock 
markets, underscore the reality and imminence of these threats.9  
Cyber attackers can remotely engage in wrongdoing from anywhere 
in the world using Internet connections, and their profiles are diverse, 
                                                                                                                 
 3. In 2003, the Department of Energy described the electrical grid as “aging, 
inefficient, and congested, and incapable of meeting future energy needs of the 
Information Economy without operational changes and substantial capital 
investment over the next several decades.” U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, “GRID 2030:” A 
NATIONAL VISION FOR ELECTRICITY’S SECOND 100 YEARS, at iii (2003), available at 
http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/Electric_Vision_Docu
ment.pdf. 
 4. The average power generating station was built in the 1960s and uses even 
older technology, while the average substation transformer is forty-two years old with 
a designed maximum life of forty years. LEXINGTON INST., ENSURING THE 
RESILIENCE OF THE U.S. ELECTRICAL GRID 23 (2013), available at 
http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/Postal/EnsuringResilienceofUS 
ElectricalGrid.pdf. 
 5. N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., 2012 STATE OF RELIABILITY 10 (2012), 
http://www.nerc.com/files/2012_sor.pdf. 
 6. “The Obama Administration has called for doubling the amount of U.S. 
electricity produced by renewable sources, such as wind and solar power, during the 
next three years to reduce greenhouse emissions that cause global warming.” Tom 
Doggett, U.S. Electric Grid Needs Major Overhaul: Utility, REUTERS, Jul. 23, 2009, 
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/07/24/us-usa-electricity-grid-
idUSTRE56N0HQ20090724. 
 7. See id. 
 8. See infra Part II.C. 
 9. See infra Part II.A. 
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ranging from lone hackers to ominous, well-funded government 
institutions.10 
While the United States has undertaken efforts to address 
cybersecurity through legislation and executive action, those efforts 
have been inadequate in establishing standards for how 
communications between devices and systems in the complex “Smart 
Grid”11 will be secured.12  Current legislation directs federal agencies 
to establish these “interoperability standards.”13  However, no 
mandatory standards have been established and it is unclear from 
relevant statutory language if the applicable agencies have any true 
enforcement authority.14  Implementation of interoperability 
standards by Smart Grid participants is currently performed on a 
purely voluntary basis.15 
The Internet connection required to enable the real-time 
information exchange that the Smart Grid’s devices, technologies, 
and services will rely upon allows for new digital access points to our 
nation’s electrical grid that might be exploited by cyber attackers.16  
The prospect of such infiltration poses a substantial risk to national 
security.  The same Smart Grid features will also allow for the 
collection of massive amounts of private consumer data that can 
detail how, when, and where power is consumed in the home.  Illicit 
interception of this data raises significant personal security and 
privacy concerns.  Allowing the standards that would minimize these 
national security, personal security, and privacy concerns to remain 
                                                                                                                 
 10. See infra Part II.B. 
 11. The “Smart Grid” is a term used to describe the United States electrical grid 
after the incorporation of the new technologies, devices, and services, see infra Part 
I.B, that are designed to build upon and transform the traditional electric grid, see 
infra Part I.A.  It is also used, at times, to encompass the public and private entities 
that, as a group, enable the functionality of these technologies, devices, and services.  
These modernization efforts are ongoing.  The Smart Grid is in many ways a term of 
aspiration; its prevalence is a matter of increasing degree. 
 12. See generally infra Parts III, V.A.1. 
 13. See infra Part III. 
 14. See generally infra Parts III, V.A.1. 
 15. Because no interoperability standards have been promulgated under 
applicable legislation and the agency with the responsibility of implementing such 
standards (the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission) interpreted its legislatively-
delegated power as not including the ability to promulgate enforceable standards, any 
private organization’s implementation of interoperability standards constitutes 
voluntary action. Id. 
 16. See NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 
INTRODUCTION TO NISTIR 7628 GUIDELINES FOR SMART GRID CYBER SECURITY 7 
(2010), available at http://www.nist.gov/smartgrid/upload/nistir-7628_total.pdf  
(source document contains an introduction and three distinct volumes). 
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voluntary and unenforceable leaves the electrical grid and citizens 
vulnerable to harm.  This Note explores these dangers and discusses 
why granting the appropriate regulatory entities the authority to 
develop and institute mandatory, enforceable interoperability 
standards is the most appropriate means to achieving effective Smart 
Grid cybersecurity. 
Part I of this Note describes the key characteristics of the 
“Traditional Grid”17 and the Smart Grid, and sets forth the reasoning 
behind the transition to the Smart Grid and the key concerns the 
transition raises.  Part II discusses the cybersecurity threats to the 
Smart Grid by reviewing recent cyber attacks that have affected a 
broad array of industries.  It also considers the various types of cyber 
attackers and how important data and privacy concerns are 
implicated in the Smart Grid.  Part III reviews legislation and 
executive action that has played a key role in establishing the Smart 
Grid cybersecurity landscape thus far, as well as the regulatory roles 
and authorities this legislation has created.  After Part III 
demonstrates that the industry is currently operating in a voluntary 
environment free from mandatory government regulations as it 
relates to the implementation of interoperability standards, Part IV 
discusses an industry-developed standard analogue that is used to 
illustrate the possible justifications for, and pitfalls of, such a 
standard, ultimately concluding that a voluntary standard regime is an 
inappropriate solution for the Smart Grid.  Finally, Part V asserts that 
a system of federal mandatory enforceable standards applicable to all 
Smart Grid participants is the best path to defending the important 
national security and privacy interests endangered by the cyber 
threats discussed in Part II.  It argues that the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST)18 is the appropriate federal entity 
to develop and issue these mandatory standards.  Acknowledging that 
legislation reconfiguring and reassigning responsibilities and 
authorities in the Smart Grid will be necessary to follow that 
                                                                                                                 
 17. The “Traditional Grid” is the electrical grid as described in Part I.A without 
the Smart Grid technologies, devices, and services described in Part I.B. 
 18. NIST is a federal agency within the U.S. Department of Commerce whose 
“mission is to promote U.S. innovation and industrial competitiveness by advancing 
measurement science, standards, and technology in ways that enhance economic 
security and improve our quality of life.” NIST General Information, NAT’L INST. 
STANDARDS TECH., http://www.nist.gov/public_affairs/general_information.cfm (last 
visited Apr. 13, 2014).  NIST has been tasked with developing information system 
standards relevant to this Note under both the Federal Information Security 
Management Act of 2002 and the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007. 
See infra notes 170–88, 295–300. 
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recommended path, Part V concludes with key elements of a 
legislative proposal and a depiction of how the resulting regulatory 
environment might operate to effectuate better Smart Grid 
cybersecurity. 
I.  THE EVOLVING ELECTRIC GRID 
Before analyzing the benefits and challenges of the substantial 
transition from the antiquated Traditional Grid to the prospective 
Smart Grid, it is important to first assess the composition of each, as 
well as their significant points of difference. 
A. The Traditional Grid 
The Traditional Grid is a phrase used in this Note to depict the 
electrical grid as it existed before the recent modernization efforts 
that characterize the Smart Grid.  While it is conceptually helpful to 
conceive of the Traditional Grid as distinct from the Smart Grid in 
this manner so that the Smart Grid’s contributions and impact can be 
more clearly identified, it is important to note that much of the 
Traditional Grid’s infrastructure and regulatory environment persists 
today as the foundation upon which change is being enacted.  
Therefore, establishing a working understanding of the Traditional 
Grid’s composition and unique regulatory features is critical before 
expounding the Smart Grid’s novel features and the transitional 
issues to which they give rise. 
1. Composition 
In the Traditional Grid, the path of electricity is comprised of three 
main activities: generation, transmission, and distribution.19 
At “generation stations,” electricity is generated through the use of 
various fuel sources.20  Sometimes these stations are owned by the 
same utilities that serve the end customer, while others are owned by 
Independent Power Producers (IPPs), or the customer itself.21  While 
electric utility companies today still enjoy status as permissible 
“natural monopolies,” prior to the enactment of the Public Utilities 
                                                                                                                 
 19. U.S.-CAN. POWER SYS. OUTAGE TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT ON THE AUGUST 
14, 2003 BLACKOUT IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA: CAUSES AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 5–6 (2004), available at http://emp.lbl.gov/sites/all/files/interim-
rpt-Aug-14-blkout-03.pdf. 
 20. Such sources include, for example, nuclear, coal, oil, natural gas, hydro power, 
geothermal, photovoltaic, and others. Id. 
 21. Id. 
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Regulatory Policy Act of 1978 (PURPA), utilities were significantly 
more vertically integrated.22 
Once electricity is generated, it must be transmitted across some 
360,000 miles of transmission lines.23  The transmission lines 
interconnect throughout the nation at various switching stations and 
substations, forming the power “grid.”24  At a final substation the 
incoming high-voltage power is “stepped down” to safer levels for 
distribution to consumers,25 commonly by way of the familiar 
overhead poles and wiring or underground systems. 
This generation-to-consumer model operates within a continental 
electrical infrastructure.  The continental United States is comprised 
of three distinct power grids: the “Eastern Interconnection,” the 
“Western Interconnection,” and the “Texas Interconnection.”26  The 
Eastern Interconnection includes the eastern two-thirds of the nation, 
while the Western Interconnection includes the western third, with 
the Texas Interconnection serving only most of Texas.27 
Each of these Interconnections currently operates independently; 
however, efforts are underway to connect all three at the “Tres 
Amigas Superstation.”28  Currently, within each interconnection, 
electricity flows along the paths of least resistance, is used almost the 
instant it is produced, and “flows over virtually all transmission lines 
from generators to loads.”29  This means, as the Supreme Court 
articulated, “any electricity that enters the grid immediately becomes 
a part of a vast pool of energy that is constantly moving in interstate 
commerce.”30  Therefore, the Tres Amigas Superstation would create 
a national pool of energy that can be shared between any and all 
                                                                                                                 
 22. A vertically integrated entity owns operations in multiple levels of the 
electrical supply chain (including generation, transmission, and distribution). See 
James D. Elliott, Electric Utility Regulation Reform in New York: Economic 
Competitiveness at the Expense of the Environment?, 13 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 281, 
285 (1995).  PURPA forced utilities to purchase electric power from IPPs and other 
“small power production facilities,” increasing competition at this level of the grid 
and reducing the degree of monopolistic dominance by utilities in the electricity 
industry. See 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a) (2012); Elliott, supra, at 291–92. 
 23. INFRASTRUCTURE SEC. & ENERGY RESTORATION, supra note 2. 
 24. See U.S.-CAN. POWER SYS. OUTAGE TASK FORCE, supra note 19, at 6. 
 25. Id. at 4. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Kevin Bullis, Superconductors to Wire a Smarter Grid, MIT TECH. REV. 
(Nov. 12, 2009), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/416253/superconductors-to-
wire-a-smarter-grid. 
 29. See U.S.-CAN. POWER SYS. OUTAGE TASK FORCE, supra note 19, at 6. 
 30. New York v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 535 U.S. 1, 2 (2002). 
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states in the continental United States.  This pool would allow for 
more reliable and less costly distribution of energy, including 
renewable energy.  For example, the availability of wind energy 
would grow less dependent on regional weather,31 and the renewable 
energy developed in the wind-blown Texas Panhandle would no 
longer be “trapped” in the Texas Interconnection.32 
2. Utilities as Natural Monopolies 
Massive fixed-cost capital is required to enter the generation, 
transmission, and distribution markets.  Both government and private 
parties recognized this fact in the Traditional Grid’s early days and 
concluded that it would be wasteful of societal resources to allow for 
regular competition.33  Thus, a “compact of sorts” was formed 
between utilities and the people: utilities would be granted 
monopolies over certain geographical regions in exchange for 
subjecting themselves to intensive regulation, including rate-setting, 
in an arrangement “alien to the free market.”34  Utilities are thus 
considered permissible “natural monopolies.”35 
Utilities secure designation as natural monopolies from state and 
local governments, the right to freedom from local competition, a 
guaranteed market base, delegated eminent domain powers, 
guaranteed revenues to remain solvent, guaranteed fair rates of 
return on prudent capital investments, and lower costs of borrowing 
as a result of this bargain.36  At the same time, state governments 
retain substantial regulatory oversight and the ability to set prices 
(and thus ensure fair and non-discriminatory prices for ratepayers).37 
This “compact” is relevant to the focus of this Note because as 
electric utilities evolve from their business model of the last century 
                                                                                                                 
 31. See Karen Uhlenhuth, Tres Amigas Seeks to Break US Grids Out of 
Isolation, MIDWEST ENERGY NEWS (Sept. 5, 2013), http://www.greentechmedia.com/ 
articles/read/tres-amigas-seeks-to-break-u.s.-grids-out-of-isolation (providing the 
example that the wind in Kansas may be producing at different times than the wind in 
Texas, and the flexibility provided by the Tres Amigas station would make it possible 
to take advantage of that diversity in the weather). 
 32. See id. 
 33. Elias L. Quinn & Adam L. Reed, Envisioning the Smart Grid: Network 
Architecture, Information Control, and the Public Policy Balancing Act, 81 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 833, 844–45 (2010). 
 34. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 810 F.2d 
1168, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 35. See Katharine Southard, U.S. Electric Utilities: The First Public-Private 
Partnerships?, 39 PUB. CONT. L.J. 395, 401 (2010). 
 36. See id. at 402. 
 37. See Elliott, supra note 22, at 298; Quinn & Reed, supra note 33, at 845–46. 
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to become more diversified businesses engaging in transactions 
beyond regional rate schemes, questions regarding the compact’s 
validity may rise to the surface.  Challenges to traditional monopoly 
protections and state jurisdiction may create significant tensions 
amongst the Smart Grid stakeholders, especially customers who have 
limited, if any, alternative market options should they grow 
discontent with their utility’s behavior. 
B. The Smart Grid 
While the Smart Grid is developing upon the existing infrastructure 
of the Traditional Grid, it has a number of distinguishable features 
that both provide significant benefits and present significant 
transitional challenges. 
1. Distinguishing Features 
NIST identified seven categories of participants—or “domains”—
within the Smart Grid, the first three of which have already been 
mentioned: (1) Bulk Generation, (2) Transmission, (3) Distribution, 
(4) Customer, (5) Markets, (6) Operations, and (7) Service Provider.38  
While electricity only flows between (1) and (4), all domains 
exchange digital communications that must be adequately secured.39  
Ultimately, the Smart Grid will likely result in dramatic changes to 
each domain; however, some of the most distinctive and important 
changes will be taking place in the Customer, Markets, Operations, 
and Service Provider domains. 
In the Customer domain, two types of Smart Grid technologies are 
crucial.  First, the  “Smart Meter” replaces the simpler analog meter 
on the side of most homes today and uses digital technology to record 
customer consumption information on a frequent basis (potentially 
minute-to-minute or greater frequency as technology progresses), 
with the information regularly transmitted over the Smart Grid 
                                                                                                                 
 38. See CYBER SEC. WORKING GRP., NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., 
GUIDELINES FOR SMART GRID CYBER SECURITY: VOL. 1, SMART GRID CYBER 
SECURITY STRATEGY, ARCHITECTURE, AND HIGH LEVEL REQUIREMENTS 14 (2010), 
[hereinafter NIST GUIDELINES VOL. 1], available at http://www.nist.gov/smartgrid/ 
upload/nistir-7628_total.pdf (source document contains an introduction and three 
distinct volumes). 
 39. See id. at 14, 17 (identifying unique communication paths—or “logical 
interfaces”—between Smart Grid participants). 
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network to various entities that can derive value from that 
information.40 
“Technologies, devices, and services that access and leverage 
energy usage information, such as smart appliances that can use 
energy data to turn on when energy is cheaper or renewable energy is 
available,” represent the second crucial Smart Grid technology in the 
Customer domain.41  Smart Appliances are equipped for 
communication with Smart Meters and allow for the recording of 
extremely granular, appliance-specific consumption data.42 
In 2009, Vice President Joe Biden stated in a report to President 
Obama that eight million homes had been equipped with Smart 
Meters and declared projections of twenty-six million homes by 2013, 
and forty million by 2015.43  But in May 2012, almost one-in-three 
households had a Smart Meter, with thirty-six million Smart Meters 
having been installed, and it was projected that sixty-five million 
Smart Meters would be installed by 2015—more than twenty-five 
million above Vice President Biden’s 2009 estimate.44  The torrent 
pace at which this nascent technology is being deployed underscores 
the importance of establishing mandatory interoperability standards 
early on to ensure a more secure grid. 
In the Markets and Operations domains, it can be expected that 
businesses will communicate information “across organizational 
boundaries, thus posing trust issues,”45 when, for example, a utility 
                                                                                                                 
 40. Andreas S.V. Wokutch, The Role of Non-Utility Service Providers in Smart 
Grid Development: Should They Be Regulated, and if So, Who Can Regulate 
Them?, 9 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 531, 534 (2011). 
 41. NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, A 
POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR THE 21ST CENTURY GRID: ENABLING OUR SECURE 
ENERGY FUTURE 1 (2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ 
microsites/ostp/nstc-smart-grid-june2011.pdf. 
 42. CYBER SEC. WORKING GRP., NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., 
GUIDELINES FOR SMART GRID CYBER SECURITY: VOL. 2, PRIVACY AND THE SMART 
GRID 27 (2010) [hereinafter NIST GUIDELINES VOL. 2], available at 
http://www.nist.gov/smartgrid/upload/nistir-7628_total.pdf (source document contains 
an introduction and three distinct volumes). 
 43. Memorandum from Joseph Biden, Vice President of the United States, to 
Barack Obama, President of the United States 5 (Dec. 15, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/administration-
official/vice_president_memo_on_clean_energy_economy.pdf. 
 44. INST. FOR ELEC. EFFICIENCY, UTILITY-SCALE SMART METER DEPLOYMENTS, 
PLANS, & PROPOSALS 1 (2012), available at http://www.edisonfoundation.net/iee/.../ 
iee_smartmeterrollouts_0512.pdf ; INST. FOR ELEC. EFFICIENCY, UTILITY-SCALE 
SMART METER DEPLOYMENTS: A FOUNDATION FOR EXPANDED GRID BENEFITS 1–2 
(2013), available at http://www.edisonfoundation.net/iee/Documents/IEE_Smart 
MeterUpdate_0813.pdf; Memorandum, supra note 43, at 5. 
 45. NIST GUIDELINES VOL. 1, supra note 38, at 44. 
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shares collected data with marketers or contractors assisting in the 
provision of electricity.  With the new mass of information that will be 
accrued through Smart Grid technologies, it can also be expected that 
“many customers, possibly through aggregators or other energy 
service providers, will participate in the retail energy market, thus 
vastly increasing the number of participants.”46  The Markets and 
Operations domains will have to adapt to the advent of these new 
entrants in the Service Provider domain. 
These “other energy service providers,” also referred to as “Edge 
Service Providers” or “Non-Utility Service Providers” (ESPs) will 
operate in the Smart Grid not as providers or energy consumers, but 
as businesses that “utilize the information produced by advanced 
meters and other utility-deployed smart grid technologies in 
innovative ways.”47  They might assist consumers in analyzing their 
electricity consumption to help eliminate inefficiencies and lower 
electrical bills,48 or offer a management system that allows consumers 
to control electric usage in their residence remotely in an innovative, 
cost-saving manner.49 
Essentially, there is no question that the Smart Grid will probably 
result in dramatic changes across a transformed electrical industry.  
Utilities will perform new functions, ESPs will bypass the utility and 
derive their own value from customer consumption data, and utilities 
will sell customer information to marketers.  Amongst these likely 
outcomes, one common theme emerges: massive caches of consumer 
data will be generated and communicated via the Internet across 
inter- and intra-organizational boundaries and digital channels in a 
manner that is alien to the functioning of the Traditional Grid. 
                                                                                                                 
 46. Id. 
 47. Quinn & Reed, supra note 33, at 843 n.27. 
 48. See Wokutch, supra note 40, at 535–36 (discussing “Electric Efficiency 
Analysis” solutions, such as Google’s PowerMeter, which provides an online web 
portal for monitoring home energy consumption). 
 49. One such “Energy Management” solution is AlertMe Energy, which requires 
attachment of hardware to the consumer’s electric meter and a broadband hub that 
collects and transmits usage data over the Internet to a United Kingdom-based 
software company’s cloud-based application, which can read signals from compatible 
“smart” appliances, allowing consumers to control the appliances remotely through a 
web browser or smartphone. See id. at 536–37; Heather Clancy, AlertMe Supports 
Lowe’s Residential Energy Management Platform, GREENTECH PASTURES (July 24, 
2012), http://www.zdnet.com/alertme-supports-lowes-residential-energy-management 
-platform-7000001494. 
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2. Benefits 
The Smart Grid’s benefits are substantial, which Congress 
recognized by allocating $4.5 billion for electricity delivery and 
energy reliability modernization efforts through the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA).50  The 
Department of Energy (DOE) issued ninety-nine grants totaling $7.8 
billion51 through its Smart Grid Investment Grant Program to 
accelerate development of the Smart Grid.52 
The DOE has identified five primary Smart Grid Technologies that 
will provide key benefits of resiliency, reliability, environmental 
stewardship, security, cost effectiveness, and economic 
stability/development: (1) the Smart Grid Network, (2) Advanced 
Metering, (3) Phasor Measurement Units, (4) Renewable, Distributed 
Power Generation, and (5) Energy Storage. 
The Smart Grid Network is characterized by two-way 
communications between energy suppliers and customers.53  This 
scheme allows customers to transmit near-real-time consumption 
information to utilities, while utilities can in turn communicate near-
real-time energy pricing back to consumers.54  Utilities can thus more 
effectively monitor and manage electrical loads and demands given 
their access to comprehensive “live” data, while allowing customers 
to adjust their consumption patterns based on real-time pricing 
information.55  Such two-way communication also facilitates more 
                                                                                                                 
 50. See NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 41, at 2. 
 51. $3.4 billion originated from ARRA funding, with an additional $4.4 billion 
coming from private sector investments. Joseph Paladino, Energy Department’s 
Investment Grant Program Advances Rapidly, as Scheduled, IEEE SMART GRID 
NEWSLETTER (Feb. 2013), http://smartgrid.ieee.org/february-2013/793-energy-
department-s-investment-grant-program-advances-rapidly-as-scheduled. 
 52. Id. 
 53. OFFICE OF ELEC. DELIVERY & ENERGY RELIABILITY, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 
STUDY OF SECURITY ATTRIBUTES OF SMART GRID SYSTEMS—CURRENT CYBER 
SECURITY ISSUES 4 (2009), available at http://www.inl.gov/scada/publications/d/ 
securing_the_smart_grid_current_issues.pdf. 
 54. NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NIST 
FRAMEWORK AND ROADMAP FOR SMART GRID INTEROPERABILITY STANDARDS, 
RELEASE 1.0, at 21 (2010) [hereinafter NIST FRAMEWORK RELEASE 1.0], available at 
http://www.nist.gov/public_affairs/releases/upload/smartgrid_interoperability_final. 
pdf. 
 55. For example, if prices are highest when demand is at its peak, a customer, 
armed with the knowledge of sky-high energy prices at those peaks, may choose to 
conserve, allowing for “peak load reduction,” a two-way benefit (price savings and 
reduced strain on the grid). See OFFICE OF ELEC. DELIVERY & ENERGY RELIABILITY, 
supra note 53, at 4.  The enabling of these customer choices “based on how, when, 
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appropriate and proactive utility responses to power outages.56  
“Advanced Metering Infrastructure,” including Smart Meters and 
Smart Appliances, is central to the realization of these network 
benefits.57 
Phasor Measurement Units dramatically alter the landscape of the 
Bulk Generation and Transmission domains.  These pieces of 
equipment allow the grid to sense problems quickly and respond 
effectively.58  It was perhaps the capabilities of this equipment that 
President Obama was alluding to in his 2013 State of the Union 
Address when he made reference to the notion of “self-healing power 
grids.”59 
Enhanced responsiveness in the Smart Grid allows for better 
integration of renewable energy sources such as solar and wind 
energy sources, which “cannot be turned on or off as needed.”60  A 
wired grid engaging in two-way communications and equipped with 
high-tech sensors allows the grid to adjust to these inherent variations 
in output by drawing energy from other sources when needed.61 
                                                                                                                 
and how much electricity they use” is a touted benefit of the Smart Grid. See NIST 
GUIDELINES VOL. 2, supra note 42, at 3. 
 56. See OFFICE OF ELEC. DELIVERY & ENERGY RELIABILITY, supra note 53, at 4–
5. 
 57. See CYBER SEC. WORKING GRP., NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., 
GUIDELINES FOR SMART GRID CYBER SECURITY: VOL. 3, SUPPORTIVE ANALYSES AND 
REFERENCES app. F-1 (2010) [hereinafter NIST GUIDELINES VOL. 3], available at 
http://www.nist.gov/smartgrid/upload/nistir-7628_total.pdf (source document contains 
an introduction and three distinct volumes).  “Advanced Metering Infrastructure” 
includes the hardware and software that creates a “bi-directional network” between 
advanced metering equipment (e.g., Smart Meters and Smart Appliances) and a 
utility’s systems, “enabling collection and distribution of information to customers 
and other parties.” Id. 
 58. Phasor Measurement Units will “enhance the situational awareness of the 
national grid and enable system operators to react to system disturbances and 
anomalies more accurately and expeditiously.” OFFICE OF ELEC. DELIVERY & 
ENERGY RELIABILITY, supra note 53, at 6.  These high-tech devices will be placed 
throughout the grid and take precise measurements of voltages, currents, and 
frequency, communicating that information back to grid operators at high speed. See 
id.  Combining the data from all Phasors throughout the grid will provide operators 
with a comprehensive picture of the nation’s grids in any given area, and by 
developing “advanced operating procedures/algorithms,” the data can be used to 
allow for automated responses by the grid to stimuli, potentially avoiding or 
mitigating power outages, quality problems, and service disruptions. See id. 
 59. President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Feb. 12, 2013), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/remarks-president 
-state-union-address. 
 60. NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 41, at 14.  For additional information 
regarding how Smart Grid technologies will foster the integration of renewable 
energy sources, see generally id. at 13–14, 25. 
 61. See OFFICE OF ELEC. DELIVERY & ENERGY RELIABILITY, supra note 53, at 6. 
1362 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLI 
Finally, advances in energy storage technologies mean that, in the 
Smart Grid, energy can be stored for later consumption when it is 
least expensive to generate, allowing for reduced peak loads.  This 
reduces strain on the system and increases cost savings.62  Such energy 
storage could also serve significant benefits in times of crisis, such as 
the August 2003 Northeast blackout63 or 2012’s Hurricane Sandy. 
While these substantial benefits offer great promise for consumers, 
businesses, and the United States’ energy future, their realization calls 
for fundamental changes to the Traditional Grid that present a 
number of challenges. 
C. Transition Issues 
The Smart Grid carries with it many fundamental changes for a 
variety of stakeholders.  For the utility industry, it means a transition 
from a business model of purely supplying electricity to a hybrid 
business model where energy delivery is coupled with other services 
revolving around the collection and management of granular 
customer consumption data.64  Customers will be presented with new 
opportunities to monitor and adjust their electricity consumption.  
For ESPs, the Smart Grid presents new business prospects. While 
promising in some regards, such unfamiliar activity occurring on such 
a large scale in an industry that is inextricably intertwined with 
virtually every aspect of everyday life represents a formidable 
undertaking. 
Utilities face the challenge of first making possible the 
sophisticated power-flow management noted above,65 and then 
providing that kind of meticulous distribution effectively.66  While the 
idea of utilizing live data from Phasor Measurement Units and Smart 
Meters to adjust transmission, distribution, and storage of electricity 
sounds ideal, it represents a stark contrast from the more 
straightforward traditional responsibility of providing energy to meet 
demand.  The two-way network outlined above necessarily entails 
communication between computers, devices, software, and other 
                                                                                                                 
 62. See id. at 7. 
 63. See id. 
 64. See Quinn & Reed, supra note 33, at 842. 
 65. See supra notes 53–64 and accompanying text. 
 66. See NIST GUIDELINES VOL. 1, supra note 38, app. B-1. 
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technologies that present national security threats posed by hackers 
and other cyber attackers that did not exist in the Traditional Grid.67 
While the customer data noted above will allow for worthwhile 
benefits, the Smart Grid will “greatly expand the amount of data that 
can be monitored, collected, aggregated, and analyzed,” which will 
raise significant privacy concerns.68  Time-stamped dwelling activity 
reports being transmitted over the Internet, if intercepted, could 
reveal personal and intimate details that may give rise to personal 
security concerns, such as a computer-savvy thief detecting when a 
dwelling has gone empty for an extended period of time.69 
The Smart Grid will allow for enhancements in efficiency and 
reliability through the collection of massive amounts of granular data 
collected from Smart Meters and various points in the transmission 
system.  However, if this new Internet-enabled Smart Grid is not 
properly secured, access to its systems by wrongdoers could lead to 
devastating consequences. 
II.  THE CYBERSECURITY THREAT 
The Smart Grid will rely on Internet connectivity in moving 
massive amounts of data through many channels and entities in order 
to fully capture the data’s potential value.70  With such extensive 
digital communication occurring, the possibility of illicit interception 
or manipulation of those communications increases.71  In the Smart 
Grid realm, cyber intruders, in many ways, have the upper hand.  To 
this point, they have been successful in breaching some of the most 
secure operations in the world, including electrical utilities, nuclear 
programs, an oil company, banks, and a stock exchange.72  While the 
popular view of a hacker may be a single computer-savvy individual, 
institutional hacking is also prevalent today.73  More sophisticated 
                                                                                                                 
 67. See NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 41, at 49 (noting that “a smarter 
grid includes more devices and connections that may become avenues for intrusions, 
error-caused disruptions, malicious attacks, destruction, and other threats”). 
 68. NIST GUIDELINES VOL. 3, supra note 57, at 19. 
 69. See NIST GUIDELINES VOL. 2, supra note 42, at 11. 
 70. See id. at 29–33 (identifying the types of data that can be collected in the 
Smart Grid and the different ways in which that data is valuable to interested 
parties). 
 71. See NIST GUIDELINES VOL. 1, supra note 38, at 6 (explaining that as the grid 
becomes “smarter” it will contain “more interconnections that may become portals 
for intrusions, error-caused disruptions, malicious attacks, and other threats”). 
 72. See infra Part II.A. 
 73. See, e.g., Michael Kelley & Geoffrey Ingersoll, How the US Invited Iranian 
Hackers to Attack America’s Banks, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 18, 2012), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/us-started-worldwide-cyberwar-hacking-2012-
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attacks can be launched with the added resources behind such 
operations.74 
One issue in responding to these threats is that securing the grid is 
expensive.  In 2010, Pike Research, a “Cleantech Market Intelligence 
Firm,” estimated that in the following five years there would be a 
cumulative investment in Smart Grid security of $21 billion, 
representing approximately fifteen percent of all Smart Grid capital 
investments.75  While these numbers may seem large, some wonder if 
enough is being spent.  Pike Research stated in a 2011 report that 
“[u]tility cyber security is in a state of near chaos.  After years of 
vendors selling point solutions, utilities investing in compliance 
minimums rather than full security, and attackers having nearly free 
rein, the attackers clearly have the upper hand.”76  The report cited 
the lack of enforceable standards as a reason for the chaos and a 
hindrance to action since it causes utilities and vendors to take a 
“wait-and-see posture” until the regulatory environment becomes 
clearer, rather than act now and risk “losing their entire investment if 
future laws invalidate their approach.”77 
Conversely, cyber attacks can be relatively inexpensive to execute.  
This is because the “defense needs to be strong everywhere, while the 
offense only needs to succeed in one place;” once a hacker gains 
access to a network, the whole network may be compromised if the 
breach goes undetected or insufficient procedures are in place to 
quarantine the breach.78  This concern is important to the Smart Grid, 
where the communication network will become increasingly complex 
in both the Operations and Service Provider domains, increasing the 
                                                                                                                 
10#ixzz2HhqDtUMP (reporting that more than one hundred-forty countries are 
actively developing cyber-espionage and warfare capabilities). 
 74. See, e.g., Lee Ferran, Edward Snowden: U.S., Israel ‘Co-Wrote’ Cyber Super 
Weapon Stuxnet, ABC NEWS (July 9, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/ 
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 75. See Smart Grid Cyber Security Market to Reach $3.7 Billion by 2015, 
According to Pike Research, BUS. WIRE (June 23, 2010), 
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20100623005613/en/Smart-Grid-Cyber-
Security-Market-Reach-3.7. 
 76. PIKE RESEARCH, UTILITY CYBER SECURITY: SEVEN KEY SMART GRID 
SECURITY TRENDS TO WATCH IN 2012 AND BEYOND 1 (2011), available at 
http://www.navigantresearch.com/wp-assets/uploads/2011/11/UCS-11-Pike-
Research.pdf. 
 77. See id. at 5. 
 78. Peter Swire & Kenesa Ahmad, Encryption and Globalization, 13 COLUM. SCI. 
& TECH. L. REV. 416, 455 (2012). 
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system’s vulnerability with added access points.79  Additionally, 
operators and consumers will seek to control equipment (valves and 
switches for utilities, appliances for consumers) remotely through the 
Internet—types of remote connections that could “allow[] attackers a 
gateway into the system.”80  The damage that can be caused by this 
type of breach was demonstrated in 2007, when the Department of 
Homeland Security performed the staged “Aurora” experimental 
remote attack on a generator that was part of a replicated power 
plant’s control system.81  Researchers were able to “change[] the 
operating cycle of the generator, sending it out of control.”82  In a 
released video, the generator jerks violently several times before the 
equipment begins to fail, ultimately releasing massive amounts of 
white and black smoke upon its destruction.83  The Aurora 
experiment would come to foreshadow malicious cyber attacks on 
various institutions all over the world. 
A. Recent Attacks 
The staged Aurora attack perhaps marked the first moment of 
widespread public awareness that digital communication in critical 
infrastructure operations was a double-edged sword.  On the one 
hand, it offers cost savings, convenience, and efficiency, but on the 
other hand, it creates dangerous vulnerabilities.  Although the 
implications of Aurora were frightening, there was skepticism that 
such an attack could or would happen outside a staged environment.84  
That perception would quickly change with the onset of cyber attacks 
on various energy companies. 
                                                                                                                 
 79. See NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 41, at 49 (suggesting that a 
smarter grid’s “[n]etworks of computers, intelligent electronic devices, software, and 
communication technologies present greater infrastructure protection challenges 
than those of the traditional infrastructure” as they “may become avenues for 
intrusions, error-caused disruptions, malicious attacks, destruction, and other 
threats”). 
 80. Ellen Nakashima & Steven Mufson, Hackers Have Attacked Foreign Utilities, 
CIA Analyst Says, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/01/18/AR2008011803277_pf.html. 
 81. The “Aurora” experiment was conducted in March of 2007 at the Department 
of Energy’s Idaho lab. See Jeanne Meserve, Sources: Staged Cyber Attack Reveals 
Vulnerability in Power Grid, CNN (Sept. 26, 2007), http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/ 
09/26/power.at.risk. 
 82. See id. 
 83. See id. 
 84. See Meserve, supra note 81 (“Despite all the warnings and worry, there has 
not been any publicly known successful cyber-attack against a power plant’s control 
system. And electric utilities have paid more attention to electronic risks than many 
other industries, adopting voluntary cyber-standards.”). 
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In 2008, computer hackers targeting countries other than the 
United States “literally turned out the lights in multiple cities after 
breaking into electrical utilities and demanding extortion payments 
before disrupting the power.”85  Later that year, a power company 
hired a “penetration-testing consultant” to test the company’s cyber 
security.  The test had to be shut down within hours because the 
hacking operation was “working too well,” with experts citing the 
power company’s system’s Internet connectivity as the key 
vulnerability.86 
In 2010, the “Stuxnet” computer virus damaged Iran’s nuclear 
program by infiltrating its Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
system (SCADA).87  At one point, the virus temporarily disabled 
approximately one-fifth of the plant’s centrifuges, which were 
spinning to purify uranium.88  While the New York Times reported 
that the United States and Israel developed the virus,89 neither 
country’s government has officially acknowledged such involvement.90 
In 2011, the “Night Dragon” cyber attacks targeted global oil, 
energy, and petrochemical companies, and were believed to have 
originated in the Shandong Province of China.91  Also discovered in 
2011 was the “Duqu” virus, thought to be an offshoot of Stuxnet, that 
was aimed more at information gathering than destruction of 
                                                                                                                 
 85. Ted Bridis, CIA: Hackers Demanding Cash Disrupted Power, NBC NEWS 
(Jan. 18, 2008), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/22734229/#.Ulwg5bQvYb6. 
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operations, see supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
 88. See David E. Sanger, Obama Ordered Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks 
Against Iran, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2012, at A1. 
 89. See id. 
 90. See Ferran, supra note 74. 
 91. N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., INDUSTRY ADVISORY: “NIGHT DRAGON” 
(2011), http://www.nerc.com/fileUploads/File/Events%20Analysis/A-2011-02-18-
01%20Night%20Dragon%20FINAL.pdf. 
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industrial control systems.92  In 2012, the “Shamoon” virus infected 
the Saudi Arabian State Oil Company, known as “Aramco,” 
destroying more than 30,000 computers using a code known as a 
“wiper” that essentially erased all of the data on the computer’s hard 
drives, rendering them useless and irreparable.93 
At the time of Aurora, electric utilities gave the impression that 
efforts were at least being considered to enhance cybersecurity 
through the adoption of “voluntary” cyber standards.94  One 
economist suggested that of all the industries, perhaps only banking, 
finance, and telecommunications had better cybersecurity than the 
electric industry.95  Attacks on these perceived security stalwarts in 
the following years would reinforce the seriousness of the threat of 
cyber attacks. 
One such stalwart, Citibank, was hacked in 2008.  Three hackers 
pled guilty to hacking Citibank ATM card numbers and Personal 
Identification Numbers to steal $2 million from customer accounts 
over a period of four months.96  In 2011, hackers gained access to the 
data of hundreds of thousands of Citigroup’s credit card customers in 
North America, with one member of the hacker group 
“Anonymous”97 describing Citigroup’s 128-bit encryption used to 
protect electronic customer information as “really not that big a 
deal . . . . The security is so weak right now, if you know a couple 
attacks, you can just go around and see what works.”98  In October of 
2012, then-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta remarked that the 
“scale and speed” with which large U.S. financial institutions were 
                                                                                                                 
 92. See MARKEY REPORT, supra note 87, at 24. 
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Cyberattack, WASH. POST, May 9, 2013, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-05-
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 94. See Meserve, supra note 81. 
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WIRED (Nov. 5, 2008), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/11/three-plead-gui. 
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countries it sees as enemies of Internet freedom.” Max Fisher, Hacker Group 
Anonymous Is No Match for North Korea, WASH. POST, June 27, 2013, 
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Hacked, DEALBOOK (June 9, 2011, 12:49 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/ 
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being hacked was “unprecedented.”99  Attacks in 2012 caused major 
disruptions to the “online banking sites of Bank of America, 
Citigroup, Wells Fargo, U.S. Bancorp, PNS, Capital One, Fifth Third 
Bank, BB&T and HSBC.”100 
In 2013, Citibank was hacked again, along with PNC Bank.101  The 
U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York 
indicated that the hack was allegedly achieved through the use of 
malware and other targeted cyber attacks, allowing the attackers to 
steal “hundreds of thousands of bank account numbers, PIN numbers, 
and other codes to withdraw millions of dollars from victim 
accounts.”102  The same defendants allegedly hacked NASDAQ by 
installing malware on NASDAQ servers, allowing them to access the 
infected servers and “execute commands on those servers, including 
commands to delete, change, or steal data.”103 
Security breaches over the last six years on energy facilities, 
financial institutions, and other organizations have demonstrated that 
individuals and entities possess the knowledge and means to launch 
successful cyber attacks.  The attackers’ identities and motives are 
diverse and should be considered in assessing the nature of the threat 
to Smart Grid security. 
B. Profile of the Attackers 
Different parties carry out cyber attacks for different reasons.  In 
2012, Verizon published a “Data Breach Investigations Report” (the 
Verizon Report), which provided several useful frameworks for 
understanding the various types of cyber attackers, their methods of 
choice, and their underlying motivations.104 
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2014] SECURING THE SMART GRID 1369 
In analyzing 855 breach incident cases,105 the Verizon Report found 
that 98% of breaches were performed by external agents, 4% by 
internal agents, and less than 1% by partner agents.106  The most 
commonly employed methods of attack included malware (69% of 
breaches) and hacking (81% of breaches).107  In assessing the 
underlying motivations for attacks, the Verizon Report concluded 
that 96% of breaches—when considering the entire pool of 
organizations affected—were motivated at least in part by “Financial 
or Personal Gain,” while “Disagreement or Protest,” “Fun, Curiosity, 
or Pride,” and “Grudge or Personal Offense” were cited as 
motivations in less than 4% of each cases.108  When narrowing the 
scope of review to cases involving large organizations, “Financial or 
Personal Gain” was still a factor in many attacks (71%), however, 
“Disagreement or Protest” and “Fun, Curiosity, or Pride” played a 
much larger role in attacking these entities (a motivating factor in 
25% and 23% of cases, respectively).109 
The Verizon Report demonstrates that financial or personal gain is 
very often a motivating factor in breaches, which is concerning within 
the context of the Smart Grid, where a primary goal is the generation 
of large caches of valuable—and what many would consider private—
data.  Disagreement, protest, or curiosity are likely motivating factors 
behind some of the troubling state-sponsored hacking groups, such as 
the Chinese organization known as the “Comment Crew,” which is 
believed to be run either by Chinese army officers or government 
contractors.110  Recently, concerns have risen that the goals of the 
Comment Crew are shifting from stealing data to manipulation of 
American critical infrastructure, including the power grid.111 
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In June of 2012, it is believed the Comment Crew was behind a 
failed “spearphishing”112 attack on Digital Bond, a firm that 
specializes in control system security consulting.  The attack sought to 
trick the recipient into installing a remote-access tool that would have 
given attackers control over the recipient’s computer and, ultimately, 
access to confidential information about the company’s casework, 
which included security consultation information for a power plant 
and a major water project.113 
Perhaps the most disturbing Comment Crew attack occurred in 
September of 2012, when Telvent, a company that designs software 
giving oil, gas, and electric grid operators remote access to valves, 
switches, and security systems, was successfully infiltrated.114  The 
attackers used malware and were able to take project files.115  Telvent 
cut off access before the attackers could take control of any 
systems.116  An employee of Digital Bond said that such an attack is 
“terrifying” since access to a vendor such as Telvent is the “holy 
grail” when it comes to acquiring the capability to take out critical 
systems.117 
President Obama addressed these events with a call to action 
during his 2013 State of the Union Address: “Now our enemies 
are . . . seeking the ability to sabotage our power grid, our financial 
institutions, our air traffic control systems.  We cannot look back 
years from now and wonder why we did nothing . . . .”118 
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C. Data, Privacy, and the Impact on Cybersecurity 
The novel operational characteristics of the Smart Grid—
particularly utilities’ capacity to maintain detailed records of 
customers’ electric energy consumption—give rise to significant 
privacy concerns that are difficult, if not impossible, for concerned 
customers to avoid. 
1. Smart Grid Privacy Concerns 
Barriers in the Traditional Grid that greatly diminished the value 
of energy consumption pattern data—and thus public concern with its 
collection—will not exist in the Smart Grid.119  Utilities will no longer 
need to send a person or crew to read home meters; data will be 
transmitted electronically over the Internet.120  Previously, not much 
value could be derived from monthly (or more infrequent) meter 
readings; in the Smart Grid, readings will now be taken multiple times 
daily.121  Further, those readings will be far different from the lump-
sum energy readings in the Traditional Grid; usage data could be 
available on a granular appliance-by-appliance level.122 
While such changes can be characterized as beneficial access that 
will allow utilities to more efficiently deliver energy and services, they 
are also more intrusive on personal privacy.  We live in an 
information-sharing age in which choices to share information are 
often deliberate and voluntary; however, in the Smart Grid, it is not 
so apparent that this same sense of “choice” will exist.123  In resisting 
such sharing, the option of living without an essential utility such as 
electricity may not be a feasible option at all.124 
NIST, in carrying out its responsibilities under the Energy 
Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA),125 developed a 
Privacy Subgroup to focus primarily on privacy within personal 
dwellings and electric vehicles.126  One conclusion that the Privacy 
                                                                                                                 
 119. See NIST GUIDELINES VOL. 2, supra note 42, at 9. 
 120. See id. at 2. 
 121. See id. 
 122. See id. 
 123. See generally Sonia K. McNeil, Privacy and the Modern Grid, 25 HARV. J.L. 
& TECH. 199, 216–17 (2011). 
 124. See Cheryl Dancey Balough, Privacy Implications of Smart Meters, 86 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 161, 174–75 (2011). 
 125. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 17385, it is the “primary responsibility” of the 
Director the NIST to “coordinate the development of a framework that includes 
protocols and model standards for information management to achieve 
interoperability of smart grid devices and systems.” 42 U.S.C. § 17385 (2012). 
 126. See NIST GUIDELINES VOL. 2, supra note 42, at 2. 
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Subgroup reached was that “[m]ost consumers probably do not 
understand their privacy exposures or their options for mitigating 
those exposures within the Smart Grid.”127  The Smart Grid reaches 
into the intimate goings-on of homes and businesses in ways that the 
Traditional Grid never had.128  As Cheryl Dancey Balough articulates 
the issue, “The ability to get rich data from the smart meters, 
however, might also just be the smart grid’s Achilles’ heel [from a 
privacy viewpoint].”129 
With such detailed energy consumption information being 
transmitted over the Internet, there is the threat that it can be 
intercepted by a criminal looking to spy on others to, for example, 
determine when a family has gone to sleep or embarked on a 
vacation, or to blackmail top officials.130  Free market supporters may 
suggest that it is the consumer’s responsibility to educate him or 
herself on the privacy implications and, once so educated, make an 
informed decision as to whether or not he or she wishes to participate 
in the Smart Grid by utilizing its technologies.  Faced with threats to 
privacy posed by Smart Grid technologies like Smart Meters and 
Smart Appliances, do consumers really have a meaningful choice in 
deciding whether to use these technologies and expose themselves to 
such privacy threats? 
2. The “Illusion of Choice” in Smart Meter Installation 
Smart Meters, especially operating in conjunction with Smart 
Appliances that wirelessly communicate how much energy they are 
consuming and when,131 can “reveal much more detailed information 
about the activities within a dwelling or other premises than was 
available in the past.”132  Privy to this reality, customers across the 
                                                                                                                 
 127. Id. 
 128. See NIST GUIDELINES VOL. 1, supra note 38, at 75 (“As the Smart Grid 
reaches into homes and businesses, and as customers increasingly participate in 
managing their energy, confidentiality and privacy of their information has 
increasingly become a concern. Unlike power system reliability, customer privacy is a 
new issue.”). 
 129. See Balough, supra note 124, at 163–64. 
 130. In 2005, it was reported that “someone with inside access” to the cellphone 
company, Vodafone, had “been bugging more than 100 high-ranking government 
officials and dignitaries including the prime minister of Greece, his wife, and the 
Mayor of Athens.” John Markoff, Engineers as Counterspies: How the Greek 
Cellphone System Was Bugged, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2007, 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/07/10/engineers-as-counterspys-how-the-greek-
cellphone-system-was-bugged. 
 131. See NIST GUIDELINES VOL. 2, supra note 42, at 27. 
 132. See id. at 13. 
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nation have taken issue with their inability to “opt out” of Smart 
Meter installations at their home, preferring instead to maintain their 
current mechanical meter and the status quo if possible.133 
Some Public Utilities Commissions (PUCs), such as Maine’s, have 
ordered utilities to make opting out an option for customers, but have 
allowed utilities to charge customers a fee to exercise this option—a 
policy that has also met resistance.134  The Supreme Judicial Court of 
Maine recently held in Friedman v. Public Utilities Commission that 
utilities retain discretion as to what equipment is used in conjunction 
with their provision of services.135  The court held that the customers 
permitted the utility to choose what meter it would use “by virtue of 
their agreement to purchase service from [the utility].”136  Thus, 
utilities could swap out a mechanical meter for a Smart Meter at their 
discretion unless the customer elected to opt out of the installation, in 
which case an opt-out fee would be imposed.  One problem with the 
contractual argument the court set forth in this case is that since 
utilities operate in a monopolistic environment free from local 
competitors,137 a utility contract can take on an adhesive “take-it-or-
leave-it” character, leaving residents with no option to choose 
another electric energy provider and questionable legal recourse 
despite their legitimate privacy concerns. 
                                                                                                                 
 133. See Where Smart Meters are Optional/Free or Free, CENTER FOR 
ELECTROSMOG PREVENTION, http://www.electrosmogprevention.org/stop-ca-smart-
meter-news/where-smart-meters-are-optional (last visited Apr. 13, 2014) (providing 
resources and discussions of opt-out policies and legislation in various states). 
 134. The penalized customers have argued that incentives for “opting in,” as 
opposed to penalties for “opting out,” given the nature of their health and privacy 
concerns, would be more appropriate. See Ten-Person Complaint Pursuant to 35-A 
M.R.S.A. Section 1302 Regarding “Smart Meters” & “Smart Meter” Opt-Out as 
Promulgated by the Maine Public Utilities Commission (MPUC), No. 2011-00262 
(Me. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Aug. 1, 2011).  In California, PG&E has instituted a similar 
opt-out fee policy, claiming that the fees are to cover installing analog meters in 
homes that already had Smart Meters installed but want to switch back, as well as 
worker wages for monthly meter readings since it would not be “fair to expect 
neighbors who keep their SmartMeters to have to pay for the cost of the meter 
reader.” Dana Hull, PG&E Customers Can Opt Out of SmartMeters—For $75, Plus 
$10 a Month, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Feb. 1, 2012, http://www.mercurynews.com/ 
breaking-news/ci_19869073. 
 135. Friedman v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 48 A.3d 794 (Me. 2012). 
 136. Id. at 801.  The Terms and Conditions gave the utility the right to select and 
alter the metering equipment used in conveying electricity to the customer, as well as 
the right to access the customer’s property to inspect, repair, or remove the utility’s 
property. Id. 
 137. Utilities are considered natural monopolies and are permitted to operate free 
from local competition as a result of a compact with state governments that will carry 
over from the Traditional Grid. See supra Part I.A. 
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Even if Smart Meters are financially imposed upon consumers in 
this manner, some may argue that consumers still have a free market 
choice that will allow them to avoid this privacy exposure: they can 
refuse to purchase the Smart Appliances that communicate 
appliance-specific data to Smart Meters.  Unfortunately, this solution 
is not very effective given the inferences that can be drawn from the 
granular data accumulated by Smart Meters. 
Customer electrical consumption activities can be inferred due to 
one crucial difference between the utility’s mechanical meter in the 
Traditional Grid and the Smart Meter: the frequency with which 
meter readings are taken.  In the Traditional Grid, a utility employee 
might have recorded readings monthly.138  Meanwhile, Smart Meters 
are designed to allow for readings in fifteen-minute intervals, if not 
less.139  Even if the Smart Meters did not communicate with Smart 
Appliances and only recorded lump sum electrical consumption, the 
frequency with which the data is recorded allows for inferences as to 
what types of appliances are being used based on what is known 
about the manner in which different appliances consume electricity.140   
If Smart Appliances that communicate directly with Smart Meters 
become more popular in households, they would only remove the 
need for such inference.  The revealing data would then be conveyed 
over the Internet to utilities and possibly other Smart Grid 
participants like ESPs, insurance companies, or marketers.141  Strong 
cybersecurity is necessary to prevent illicit interception of that data. 
Government efforts to gain access to these detailed records for 
investigatory purposes have also raised significant issues.  In addition 
                                                                                                                 
 138. See NIST GUIDELINES VOL. 2, supra note 42, at 13–14. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Appliances produce “signatures” that allow someone analyzing an otherwise 
anonymous set of data to identify when certain appliances are being used. See NAT’L 
INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., supra note 16, at 19.  The signatures are created by the 
unique manner in which certain appliances consume energy.  Research has indicated 
that a review of electricity consumption data for appliance signatures can reveal 
when, throughout the day, a refrigerator comes on, a kettle is activated, a toaster is 
used, clothes are washed, and an oven is preheating. See ELIAS L. QUINN, SMART 
METERING & PRIVACY: EXISTING LAW AND COMPETING POLICIES 3 (2009), available 
at http://www.dora.state.co.us/puc/DocketsDecisions/DocketFilings/09I-593EG/09I-
593EG_Spring2009Report-SmartGridPrivacy.pdf.  NIST documentation suggests 
that “[a]s the time intervals between smart meter data collection points decreases, 
appliance use will be inferable from overall utility usage data and other Smart Grid 
data with even greater accuracy.” See NIST GUIDELINES VOL. 2, supra note 42, at 14. 
 141. See NIST GUIDELINES VOL. 2, supra note 42, at 29–33. 
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to Fourth Amendment concerns,142  NIST, journalists, and scholars 
have demonstrated how efforts by the government to legally require 
that Internet communication providers build “backdoors” into their 
communication systems to enable government wiretapping, if 
successful, would increase the vulnerability of Internet 
communication networks like the Smart Grid.143  These government 
                                                                                                                 
 142. For thorough and insightful discussions of the Smart Grid’s Fourth 
Amendment implications, see generally Balough, supra note 124; McNeil, supra note 
123. 
 143. NIST documentation has noted that “[c]urrent law both protects private 
electronic communications and permits government access to real-time and stored 
communications, as well as communications transactional records,” citing the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act as an example. See NIST GUIDELINES VOL. 
2, supra note 42, at 12.  Those documents also cited a law important to the Smart 
Grid Fourth Amendment discussion known as the Communications Assistance for 
Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), which requires “telecommunications carriers and 
equipment manufacturers . . . to design their systems to enable lawful access to 
communications.” Id.  In addition to the Fourth Amendment concerns related to 
government surveillance of in-home activities such a law raises, the law could also 
lead to system vulnerabilities.  By building in “back doors” for government 
wiretapping, access points are created where none existed before, and wrongdoers 
who successfully gain access to them can exploit them in malicious ways.  A New 
York Times article cited an instance in Greece where it was “discovered that hackers 
had taken advantage of a legally mandated wiretap function to spy on top officials’ 
phones, including the prime minister’s.” Charles Savage, U.S. Tries to Make It Easier 
to Wiretap the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/ 
09/27/us/27wiretap.html?_r=1&.  For more on the Greek scandal, see generally 
Markoff, supra note 130; Vassilis Prevelakis & Diomidis Spinellis, The Athens Affair: 
How Some Extremely Smart Hackers Pulled Off the Most Audacious Cell-Network 
Break-In Ever, IEEE SPECTRUM (June 29, 2007), http://spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/ 
security/the-athens-affair. 
  It has been noted that while some communications service providers are 
beyond CALEA’s reach, federal law enforcement officials have been seeking new 
legislation that would require Internet communication providers to similarly establish 
“back doors” so that companies like BlackBerry, Facebook, Skype, and e-mail 
providers would be technically capable of complying with a wiretap order. See 
Savage, supra.  The two-way communication central to Smart Grid functionality 
could foreseeably qualify utilities as Internet communication providers under the 
desired law.  The result “would include being able to intercept and unscramble 
encrypted messages . . . . Several privacy and technology advocates argued that 
requiring interception capabilities would create holes that would inevitably be 
exploited by hackers.” Id. 
  More recent reports have indicated that the FBI is growing impatient with 
legislative delays in creating CALEA-like requirements for Internet communication 
providers and is “quietly pushing its plan to force surveillance backdoors on social 
networks, VoIP, and Web e-mail providers . . . asking Internet companies not to 
oppose a law making those backdoors mandatory.” Declan McCullagh, FBI: We 
Need Wiretap-Ready Web Sites—Now, CNET (May 4, 2012), http://news.cnet.com/ 
8301-1009_3-57428067-83/fbi-we-need-wiretap-ready-web-sites-now/?part=rss&subj= 
news&tag=title. 
1376 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLI 
efforts to wiretap digital communications create additional privacy 
and security concerns that consumers may wish to avoid by choosing 
not to utilize Smart Meters or Smart Appliances, only to discover that 
they lack the ability to freely exercise such choices. 
Should states follow Maine’s approach of relying upon contract 
language in granting utility companies the discretion to choose 
metering equipment, the monopolistic nature of the Traditional Grid 
would leave consumers without a meaningful choice in using Smart 
Meters, unless they choose to bear a penalty for opting out.  Even in a 
state where there is no charge for opting out144 or an “opt in” program 
is established, an increase in popularity of the Smart Grid and the 
prevalence of its technologies may make older technologies obsolete, 
indirectly pushing hesitant consumers into the Smart Grid over 
time.145   Refusing to purchase Smart Appliances does not solve the 
problem because the increased frequency of consumption recordings 
allows for inferences of appliance usage.  Whether consumers 
participate in the Smart Grid by choice or by compulsion, there 
should be a uniform, mandated approach to securing their 
consumption data given the intimate, private details it can reveal; 
details of the sort that should not be compromised by advancements 
in technology.146 
III.  EFFORTS TO ADDRESS CYBERSECURITY: THE CURRENT 
LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 
Congress and the Obama Administration have demonstrated an 
awareness of the dangers that cybersecurity vulnerabilities pose to 
national security and, in response, have factored these concerns into 
                                                                                                                 
  For additional information regarding “backdoors” and the vulnerabilities they 
can create in otherwise secured systems, see Swire & Ahmad, supra note 78. 
 144. Utilities in Vermont have been prohibited from charging customers Smart 
Meter opt-out fees. See Vermont Legislature Eliminates Smart Meter Opt-Out Fee, 
WAKE UP, OPT OUT! (May 8, 2012), http://wakeupoptout.org/2012/05/vermont-
legislature-eliminates-smart-meter-opt-out-fee. 
 145. As one scholar notes, even if a customer could legally opt out of the Smart 
Meter program, “his or her choice can in practice only be honored so long as their 
chosen alternative remains both available and technologically compatible with the 
electric grid, which is itself also in transition.” McNeil, supra note 123, at 201 n.20. 
 146. The Supreme Court has acknowledged the threat to privacy posed by 
advancements in technology.  In Kyllo v. United States, the Supreme Court held that 
the obtaining of information by sense-enhancing thermal imaging technology that 
could not otherwise be obtained except by physical intrusion constituted an unlawful 
search, and noted that “[i]n the home . . . all details are intimate details, because the 
entire area is held safe from prying government eyes.” 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001) 
(emphasis in original). 
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legislation, executive orders, and project funding requirements.  
However, these responses have been inadequate in the Smart Grid 
context.  In an industry as fast-moving as the Smart Grid, mandatory 
interoperability standards must be established early if they are going 
to be established at all.  Instead, a voluntary adoption regime persists 
to the potential detriment of citizens and businesses.147 
While a self-regulatory model148 can be effective in regulating an 
industry, the model established through the Energy Policy Act of 
2005 (EPAct)149 (which amended the Federal Power Act (FPA)) to 
develop mandatory reliability standards does not fully address Smart 
Grid cybersecurity from the interoperability perspective.  The 
separate regulatory relationship established between NIST and the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) under the EISA to 
implement interoperability standards is too burdensome and inactive 
to appropriately account for the fast-moving nature of Smart Grid 
development.150  While all interoperability standards remain 
voluntary, utilities will continue to pick and choose what standards to 
abide by, often opting for minimum security to save money.  Profit 
generators, such as Smart Grid technologies, will likely continue to be 
produced amongst a patchwork of inconsistent state and/or industry 
interoperability standards, rendering the Smart Grid highly 
vulnerable to cyber attacks.151 
                                                                                                                 
 147. As noted by the NIST, “Without standards, there is the potential for 
these . . . investments to become obsolete prematurely or to be implemented without 
measures necessary to ensure security.” NIST FRAMEWORK RELEASE 1.0, supra note 
54, at 7. 
 148. A self-regulatory model is one in which the industry to be regulated develops 
the standards that will eventually regulate it. See DAVID DOLEZILEK & LAURA 
HUSSEY, REQUIREMENTS OR RECOMMENDATIONS?  SORTING OUT NERC CIP, NIST, 
AND DOE CYBERSECURITY 2 (2011), available at https://www.selinc.com/literature/ 
TechnicalPapers.  The reliability standard development process is a self-regulatory 
model by which the industry develops the standards that regulate it; however, FERC 
retains the final decision-making authority over whether or not to promulgate the 
standards. Id. 
 149. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (portions relevant 
to this Note codified as amended in scattered sections of Title 16 of the United States 
Code.). 
 150. See infra Part V.A.1–2. 
 151. As noted previously, “defense needs to be strong everywhere, while the 
offense only needs to succeed in one place,” and inconsistent security protocols run 
contrary to the coherent defense-in-depth strategy that is necessary. See Swire & 
Ahmad, supra note 78. 
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A. FERC, NERC, and the Mandatory Reliability Standard 
Development Process 
Under section 215 of the EPAct,152 Congress granted FERC the 
authority to develop mandatory standards aimed at ensuring the 
reliability of the “bulk-power system.”153  “Reliability standards” 
include requirements for “existing bulk-power system facilities, 
including cybersecurity protection, and the design of planned 
additions or modifications to such facilities.”154  The “bulk-power 
system” includes “facilities and control systems necessary for 
operating an interconnected electric energy transmission network” 
and “electric energy from generation facilities needed to maintain 
transmission system reliability.”155  Notably, the “bulk-power system” 
excludes “facilities used in the local distribution of electric energy.”156 
The statute further directed FERC to certify an “Electric 
Reliability Organization” (ERO) to “establish and enforce reliability 
standards for the bulk-power system, subject to [FERC] review.”157  
In 2006, FERC certified the North American Electric Reliability 
Corporation (NERC) as the ERO.  NERC’s principal members are 
owners, operators, and users of the bulk-power system.158  Once 
NERC has developed a reliability standard,159 it submits it to FERC 
for approval.  If FERC disapproves of a standard in whole or in part, 
it is not given statutory authority to unilaterally modify the standard; 
                                                                                                                 
 152. Codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824o (2012). 
 153. Id. 
 154. § 824o(a)(3). 
 155. § 824o(a)(1)(A)–(B). 
 156. § 824o(a)(1). 
 157. § 824o(a)(2) & (c). 
 158. H.R. REP. NO. 111-493, at 9 (2010); see also Key Players, N. AM. ELECTRIC 
RELIABILITY CORP., http://www.nerc.com/AboutNERC/keyplayers/Pages/ 
default.aspx (last visited Apr. 13, 2014) (indicating that the members of NERC’s 
eight Regional Entities include “investor-owned utilities; federal power agencies; 
rural electric cooperatives; state, municipal and provincial utilities; independent 
power producers; power marketers; and end-use customers”). 
 159. Approval of a reliability standard, or revision of an existing standard, requires 
two things: (1) a quorum of seventy-five percent of the member ballot pool, and (2) a 
two-thirds supermajority of the weighted segment of votes cast must be affirmative 
(the number of votes cast includes affirmative and negative votes, but excludes 
abstentions and non-responses). N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., STANDARD 
PROCESSES MANUAL 4–5 (2013), available at http://www.nerc.com/comm/SC/ 
Documents/Appendix_3A_StandardsProcessesManual.pdf.  A reliability standard is 
initially drawn up by a “drafting team” comprised of industry experts appointed by 
the Standards Committee. See id. at 11.  NERC uses a voting formula that “allocates 
each industry Segment an equal weight in determining the final outcome of any 
Reliability Standard action.” Id. at 4. 
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however, it may remand the standard to NERC for further 
consideration.160  FERC may also conduct formal rulemaking 
proceedings for submitted reliability standards to allow for comment 
by other interested parties.161  Ultimately, to establish a mandatory 
reliability standard, FERC must determine that the standard, as filed, 
is “just, reasonable, not unduly discriminatory or preferential, and in 
the public interest.”162  Once approved by FERC, the reliability 
standard becomes mandatory for participants in the bulk-power 
system, and enforceable by NERC.163 
NERC documentation has suggested that while interoperability 
standards operate to ensure free exchange of information in the 
Smart Grid without logical barriers, reliability standards put barriers 
in place to protect the critical infrastructure assets of the bulk power 
system.164  It has also indicated that NERC’s understanding of the 
mandate set forth under 16 U.S.C. § 824o places the focus of 
reliability standards more on physical aspects of the grid, including 
“installed equipment” and “the operation and maintenance of cyber 
assets.”165  Reliability standards shape the behavior of “asset owners 
and operators,” not “equipment and system designers, manufacturers, 
and integrators.”166  Notably, NERC documentation indicates that 
NERC does not believe that reliability standards are intended to 
“specifically protect telecommunications systems or communications 
paths,”167 underscoring the need for interoperability standards. 
B. NIST and the Interoperability Standard Development 
Process 
Under EISA,168 NIST was given the “primary responsibility” of 
developing and coordinating a framework for “interoperability of 
smart grid devices and systems” that would “contribute to an 
                                                                                                                 
 160. See § 824o(d)(4). 
 161. See DOLEZILEK & HUSSEY, supra note 148, at 2. 
 162. See § 824o(d)(2). 
 163. § 824o(e). 
 164. N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., COMMENTS OF THE NORTH AMERICAN 
ELECTRIC RELIABILITY CORPORATION ON NIST FRAMEWORK AND ROADMAP FOR 




 165. Id. at 11. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Relevant section codified at 42 U.S.C. § 17385 (2012). 
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efficient, reliable electricity network.”  Interoperability concerns the 
communication paths that exist between actors169 along which they 
connect to “transmit, store, edit, and process the information needed 
within the Smart Grid.”170  Congress granted FERC the authority to 
review “work” prepared by NIST and, upon FERC’s judgment that 
such work has led to “sufficient consensus,” institute a “rulemaking 
proceeding to adopt . . . standards and protocols . . . necessary to 
insure smart-grid functionality and interoperability in interstate 
transmission of electric power, and regional and wholesale electricity 
markets.”171  However, Congress did not define “work,” “sufficient 
consensus,” or “adopt.”  Also notably missing from the legislation 
was an enforceability provision. 
In November 2009, NIST established the Smart Grid 
Interoperability Panel (SGIP) to coordinate the development of non-
mandatory interoperability standards.172  SGIP’s members represent 
twenty-two Smart Grid stakeholder categories and “[a]ll seven 
integrated domains of the power system—customers, markets, service 
providers, operations, bulk generation, transmission, and 
distribution.”173 
                                                                                                                 
 169. “Actors” are devices, computer systems, software programs, the individuals, 
or organizations that participate in the Smart Grid. See NIST GUIDELINES VOL. 1, 
supra note 38, at 11. 
 170. Id. at 15. 
 171. § 17385(d). 
 172. See Joel B. Eisen, Smart Regulation and Federalism for the Smart Grid, 37 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 38–39 (2013).  For an interoperability standard to be 
approved and, thus, added to the “SGIP Catalog of Standards,” there must be a 
“Governing Board recommendation and a vote by the SGIP members, with both 
votes requiring 75% in favor of approval.” Id. at 39–40.  In the end, while the Catalog 
of Standards is a “toolkit” for Smart Grid stakeholders, the approved standards are in 
no way mandatory. Id. at 42. 
 173. See About Us, SMART GRID INTEROPERABILITY PANEL, http://www.sgip.org/ 
about_us/#sthash.GsJwOWVO.dpbs (last visited Apr. 13, 2014).  The SGIP in turn 
established a permanent working group known as the Cybersecurity Working Group 
(CSWG), which has compiled some of the most substantial reports on Smart Grid 
cybersecurity, including three volumes of the “Guidelines for Smart Grid Cyber 
Security,” referenced herein, and has the primary objective of “assess[ing] standards 
for applicability and interoperability across the domains of the Smart Grid.” See 
NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NIST 
FRAMEWORK AND ROADMAP FOR SMART GRID INTEROPERABILITY STANDARDS 2.0, 
at 142 (2012), available at http://www.nist.gov/smartgrid/upload/NIST_Framework_ 
Release_2-0_corr.pdf.  In April 2013, SGIP fully transitioned into a “non-profit 
private-public partnership organization . . . supported by industry stakeholder 
funding and funding provided through a cooperative agreement with NIST.” Smart 
Grid Interoperability Panel, NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH., http://www.nist.gov/ 
smartgrid/sgipbuffer.cfm (last visited Dec. 7, 2013).  Prospective “participating” or 
“observing” members must now pay fees to join the new “SGIP 2.0, Inc.” 
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NIST standards may only gain regulatory significance if they 
become part of a rulemaking proceeding by FERC under 42 U.S.C. § 
17385(d).174  Notably, though, EISA does not provide express 
authority to enforce interoperability standards created under the 
statute to either NIST or FERC, unlike the clear grant of 
enforcement authority for reliability standards under the EPAct.175  
FERC’s position is that EISA did not grant it the authority to make 
or enforce mandatory interoperability standards.176  As a result, to 
promulgate enforceable mandatory interoperability standards under 
the current EISA regime, FERC would have to reinterpret its own 
authority.  Standards set forth after such a change in policy present an 
issue because they may be invalidated as “arbitrary and capricious” 
under the Administrative Procedure Act.177 
FERC has interpreted its own authority under EISA as including 
adoption of standards that would “be applicable to all electric power 
facilities and devices with smart grid features, including those at the 
local distribution level and those used directly by retail customers so 
long as the standard is necessary for the purpose [of 16 U.S.C. § 
824o].”178  This interpretation represents a jurisdictional reach greater 
                                                                                                                 
Membership, SMART GRID INTEROPERABILITY PANEL, http://www.sgip.org/ 
membership/#sthash.BRsKbeG2.dpbs (last visited Apr. 13, 2014). 
 174. § 17385(d). 
 175. See 16 U.S.C. § 824o(e) (2012) (detailing ERO authority in enforcing 
mandated reliability standards); Eisen, supra note 172, at 37 (“Critically, the EISA 
did not give FERC any new powers to enforce any standards it might adopt, beyond 
its existing FPA authorities to regulate interstate transmission of electricity.  Its role 
is limited to ensuring the standards’ functionality.”). 
 176. Smart Grid Policy, 74 Fed. Reg. 37,098, 37,101 (July 27, 2009). 
 177. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).  A reviewing court shall “hold unlawful and 
set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” Id.  The 
Supreme Court has held that in order for a changed policy to survive “arbitrary and 
capricious” review, it suffices that (1) the new policy is permissible under the statute, 
(2) there are good reasons for it, and (3) the agency believes it to be better. See FCC 
v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009).  However, a court may 
conduct a more searching review of the justifications for the change in policy if, for 
example, the new policy rests on facts that contradict those which underlay its prior 
policy, or if the prior policy engendered serious reliance interests. Id. at 516.  In such 
a rapidly growing industry, there may be powerful reliance interests founded on 
FERC’s prior policy; for example, significant investments made by businesses with 
the understanding that FERC would not mandate enforceable communication 
security standards may prove financially detrimental should their systems be found 
noncompliant with new enforceable standards and in need of substantial retooling.  
Those reliance interests arguably become stronger as time progresses. 
 178. Smart Grid Policy, 74 Fed. Reg. 37,098 (emphasis added). 
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than the one in the reliability sphere.179  FERC’s position met with 
significant opposition from members of the electricity industry and 
PUCs.180  Industry members asserted that technical standards are 
typically developed and adopted by the private sector on a voluntary 
basis, while PUCs claimed that they retained jurisdiction over 
distribution-level projects.181  One argument set forth by utilities and 
PUCs in protecting their activities from mandated technical 
requirements was that “mandated standards preserve technologies in 
amber, making them potentially obsolete later.”182 
These statutory ambiguities and jurisdictional conflicts have led to 
a stalemate: to date, FERC has not mandated any technical 
interoperability standards.  NIST only made one attempt to submit 
standards to FERC for consideration in a potential rulemaking 
proceeding.  On October 6, 2010, NIST notified FERC that it had 
“identified five families of standards as ready for consideration by 
regulators.”183  Ultimately, FERC issued an order on July 19, 2011 
finding that there was “insufficient consensus” to institute a 
rulemaking proceeding on the five families of standards.184  Since 
then, no other standards have been submitted to FERC by NIST.  
However, NIST has continued to develop voluntary standards and 
prepare comprehensive reports analyzing, in great detail, the many 
communication interfaces existing within the Smart Grid and offering 
suggestions on how to enhance their security.  In fact, fifty-six 
voluntary standards have been approved through the SGIP process,185 
and subsequently added to SGIP’s Catalog of Standards.186 
The security deficiencies that can arise from reliance upon 
voluntary standards were illuminated in a report developed by 
Congressmen Edward J. Markey and Henry A. Waxman, then-
Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Energy and Environment 
                                                                                                                 
 179. Regulatory jurisdiction in the reliability sphere reaches the “bulk-power 
system,” which includes generational and transmission facilities, but excludes 
facilities used in the local distribution of electric energy. See supra notes 152–56 and 
accompanying text. 
 180. See Eisen, supra note 172, at 51. 
 181. See id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. FERC Order on Smart Grid Interoperability Standards, 136 F.E.R.C. 61,039, 
Slip Op. at 3 (July 19, 2011), available at http://www.ferc.gov/EventCalendar/Files/ 
20110719143912-RM11-2-000.pdf. 
 184. Id. at i.  For a deeper discussion of FERC’s order, see infra Part V.A.1. 
 185. See supra note 172 and accompanying text for a description of the process. 
 186. SGIP Catalog of Standards Information Library, NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & 
TECH., http://collaborate.nist.gov/twiki-sggrid/bin/view/SmartGrid/SGIPCoS 
StandardsInformationLibrary (last visited Apr. 13, 2014). 
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and then-Chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, 
respectively.  The report identifies both mandatory and voluntary 
NERC standards187 and polled utilities about their compliance with 
each.188  The Senators found that most utilities only comply with 
mandatory cybersecurity standards, without implementing voluntary 
NERC recommendations.189 
The utilities’ failure to implement adequate cybersecurity 
standards is also demonstrated in another report prepared by the 
DOE’s Inspector General, which showed that while ninety-nine 
grants were awarded by the DOE under its “Smart Grid Investment 
Grant” (SGIG) program totaling $7.8 billion,190 thirty-six percent of 
grant applications “were missing at least one of the required cyber 
security elements.”191  The report concluded that the approved 
cybersecurity plans did not adequately address security risks or 
planned cybersecurity controls.192 
EISA’s lack of an enforcement provision in conjunction with 
FERC’s disclaimer of authority to promulgate mandatory enforceable 
interoperability standards has resulted in a voluntary adoption 
regime.193  Congressmen Markey and Waxman’s report demonstrated 
that utilities implemented voluntary standards less often than 
mandatory ones.  The DOE Inspector General’s report showed 
inadequate cybersecurity planning by recipients of SGIG grants.  
These facts reveal some of the potential flaws of a voluntary regime. 
                                                                                                                 
 187. It is worth noting that these standards were aimed at reducing vulnerabilities 
identified by analysis of the Stuxnet and Aurora occurrences, discussed supra Part 
II.A. 
 188. See MARKEY REPORT, supra note 87, at 12. 
 189. Id.  For example, 91% of investor-owned utilities, 83% of municipally- or 
cooperatively-owned utilities, and 80% of federal entities that own major pieces of 
the bulk-power system reported compliance with the mandatory Stuxnet standards, 
while 21% of investor-owned utilities, 44% of municipally- or cooperatively-owned 
utilities, and 62.5% of federal entities reported compliance with the voluntary 
Stuxnet standards. 
 190. See Paladino, supra note 51. 
 191. See U.S. Smart Grid Projects Failing on Security, INFORMATION AGE (Jan. 
27), 2012, http://www.information-age.com/technology/information-management/ 
1687918/us-smart-grid-projects-failing-on-security. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Pursuant to a performance audit of electrical grid cybersecurity, the United 
States Government Accountability Office concluded that FERC’s lack of 
enforcement authority rendered standards developed by NIST under EISA 
voluntary. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ELECTRICITY GRID 
MODERNIZATION: PROGRESS BEING MADE ON CYBERSECURITY GUIDELINES, BUT 
KEY CHALLENGES REMAIN TO BE ADDRESSED 18 (2011), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11117.pdf. 
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C. Subsequent Legislative and Executive Efforts to Address 
Electric Grid Cybersecurity, and the Likelihood of Successful 
Future Legislation 
Since their passage, it has become apparent that neither EPAct nor 
EISA grant federal agencies the authority necessary to protect the 
electrical grid from cyber threats.  High-level FERC officials have 
cited cybersecurity as the top threat to the nation’s electric grid and 
encouraged—and at times implored—Congress to provide a federal 
body with sufficient enforcement authority to secure the grid.194  
Legislation aimed at addressing cybersecurity shortcomings in 
different ways has been proposed, with some bills coming closer to 
enactment than others. 
The electrical grid cybersecurity bill that came closest to enactment 
was introduced in the House of Representatives on April 14, 2010 as 
H.R. 5026, also known as the Grid Reliability and Infrastructure 
Defense Act (GRID Act).195  The GRID Act would have granted 
FERC the authority to issue emergency orders to protect the grid 
against a security threat brought to its attention by the President.  
FERC would have also been authorized to promulgate a rule or issue 
an order, independent of NERC, requiring owners and operators in 
the bulk-power system196 to implement measures to protect against 
any grid security vulnerability that had not been adequately 
addressed by NERC-developed reliability standards.  The bill was 
                                                                                                                 
 194. In 2011, all five FERC commissioners indicated at a House of Representatives 
hearing that they considered a cyber attack on the electrical grid as the top threat to 
electric reliability, and several emphasized the need for additional enforcement 
authority. See The American Energy Initiative, Part 12: Impacts of the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s New and Proposed Power Sector Regulations on 
Electric Reliability: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Energy and Power of the H. 
Comm. On Energy and Commerce, 112th Cong. 251–52 (2011).  In 2012, FERC 
Chairman Jon Wellinghoff implored Congress to empower a federal body with the 
powers necessary to protect the grid from cyber threats.  Chairman Wellinghoff 
stated that FERC had (1) no effective way to confidentially communicate cyber 
threats to utilities, and (2) no effective enforcement authority, adding, “I don’t care 
who has the authority, just give it to somebody so we can do something.  The 
Congress should give someone the authority.” Darius Dixon, FERC Chief Says 
Power Grid Lacks Cybersecurity Mandate, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. 
& GOVERNMENTAL AFF. (Sept. 6, 2012), http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/media/ferc-
chairman-says-electric-grid-natural-gas-lines-are-vulnerable-to-cyber-attack-. 
 195. See S. COMM. ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RES., 111TH CONG., LEGISLATIVE 
CALENDAR ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 2009–2010, at 81–82 (2010). 
 196. The GRID Act retained the definition of the bulk-power system from section 
215 of the FPA, which excluded distribution level facilities. See H.R. 5026, 111th 
Cong. § 215A(a)(1) (2010) (adopting the definition of the bulk-power system given in 
§ 215(a) of the Federal Power Act, codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824o(a)(1) (2012)). 
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reported to the house by a 47–0 vote of the House Committee on 
Energy and Commerce on May 25, 2010.  The House of 
Representatives passed H.R. 5026 on June 9, 2010.  It was then 
referred to the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee on 
June 10, 2010, where it was ultimately reported out to the Senate with 
an amendment in the nature of a substitute bill197 and placed on the 
Senate Legislative Calendar on September 27, 2010.  The bill never 
made it to the Senate floor. 
Regarding H.R. 5026’s failure in the Senate, Congressman Edward 
Markey, a co-sponsor of the original House version of the bill, 
believed that the “electric utility industry . . . successfully persuaded 
Senate Republicans to stall the bill” and had “lobbied aggressively 
against the measure.  House Republicans have acceded to industry’s 
desire to simply regulate itself.”198  At a House hearing in 2011, two 
congressmen indicated that the difficulty in the Senate was not 
whether additional legislation addressing the grid’s cybersecurity 
shortcomings should be passed, but how those shortcomings should 
be addressed.199  Other legislative efforts of varying success over the 
                                                                                                                 
 197. Notably, the substitute bill would have expanded FERC’s jurisdiction beyond 
the bulk-power system to include “systems and assets . . . used for . . . distribution of 
electric energy affecting interstate commerce . . . .” S. REP. NO. 111-331, at 1 (2010).  
Similar to H.R. 5026, it would have authorized FERC to issue its own rules or orders 
without prior notice or hearing to protect the grid from cybersecurity vulnerability.  
However, the substitute removed aspects of H.R. 5026 that addressed threats to the 
grid by electromagnetic pulses and solar flares. See id.; see also Ken Timmerman, 
Murkowski Blocks Effort to Protect US Power Grid, NEWSMAX (Oct. 14, 2010), 
http://www.newsmax.com/KenTimmerman/lisa-murkowski-emp-energy/2010/10/14/ 
id/373768. 
 198. Letter from Edward J. Markey, U.S. Representative of Mass., to Barack 
Obama, President of the United States (Aug. 8, 2012), available at 
http://democrats.naturalresources.house.gov/sites/democrats.naturalresources.house.
gov/files/documents/2012-08-08_GridSecurity_POTUS.pdf.  Utility industry reticence 
may be, at least in part, attributable to the industry’s belief that it is already subjected 
to ample mandatory cybersecurity regulations.  The American Public Power 
Association noted that “[u]nlike other industry sectors, the electric utility industry 
must comply with an extensive list of mandatory reliability standards, including 
cybersecurity standards.” AM. PUB. POWER ASSOC., STATEMENT BY THE AMERICAN 
PUBLIC POWER ASSOCIATION ON 10TH ANNIVERSARY OF 2003 NORTHEAST 
BLACKOUT (2013), available at http://www.publicpower.org (follow “Resources” 
hyperlink; then follow “Archived press releases” hyperlink; then follow “8/15/2013” 
hyperlink). 
 199. Congressman Trent Franks of Arizona stated that the “big challenge was that 
[Senators] had differing strategies on what should be done about cybersecurity.” 
Protecting the Electric Grid: H.R. ___, the Grid Reliability and Infrastructure 
Defense Act: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Energy and Power of the H. 
Comm. On Energy and Commerce, 112th Cong. 49 (2011) (statement of Trent 
Franks, U.S. Rep. of Ariz.).  Congressman James R. Langevin added, “[W]e were a 
bit frustrated by the Senate still contemplating which path forward they were going to 
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past five years have shown that while Congress is cognizant of the 
importance of filling regulatory gaps to ensure Smart Grid 
cybersecurity, it has had difficulty finding the right mix of provisions 
that would allow legislation to pass both Houses.200 
In the absence of new legislation, President Obama issued an 
executive order on February 12, 2013 entitled “Improving Critical 
Infrastructure Cybersecurity.”201  The order emphasized collaboration 
between the United States government and critical infrastructure 
owners and operators.202  It also reinforced the importance of NIST’s 
role in developing a “Cybersecurity Framework” to reduce cyber 
risks to critical infrastructure, incorporating voluntary consensus 
standards and industry best practices.203  The Secretary of Homeland 
Security was ordered to establish a “voluntary program to support the 
adoption of the Cybersecurity Framework by owners and operators of 
critical infrastructure,” as well as incentives designed to promote 
participation in the program.204  The President’s order therefore 
sustained the voluntary interoperability standard adoption 
environment that has persisted following the passage of EPAct and 
EISA, with an eventual aim of incentivizing adoption. 
                                                                                                                 
take,” with the key to achieving Senate cooperation being “perseverance.” Id. at 49–
50 (statement of James R. Langevin, U.S. Rep. of R.I.). 
 200. H.R. 668, also known as the Secure High-voltage Infrastructure for Electricity 
from Lethal Damage Act, or “SHIELD Act,” focused on the protection of the grid 
from damage by geomagnetic storms or electromagnetic pulses, which was one area 
of focus in the GRID Act as well; however, it does not address the other important 
component of the GRID Act—electronic communication-based cyber threats. See 
H.R. 668, 112th Cong. (2011).  The bill was not reported out of the Committee on 
Energy and Commerce in 2011, but was reintroduced as H.R. 2417 on June 18, 2013 
and referred to the same committee. See H.R. 668 (112th): Secure High-voltage 
Infrastructure for Electricity from Lethal Damage Act, GOVTRACK, 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr668 (last visited Apr. 13, 2014).  S. 1342, 
also known as the Grid Cyber Security Act, would have expanded FERC’s 
jurisdiction in instituting reliability standards to include distribution-level facilities 
and authorized FERC to direct NERC to develop and implement mandatory 
cybersecurity standards, rather than having to wait for NERC to bring it standards 
for approval. See S. 1342, 112th Cong. §§ 215(d)(7), 224(a)(1) (2011).  This was a 
retreat from the GRID Act, which sought to authorize FERC to promulgate 
cybersecurity rules or standards independent of NERC under certain circumstances. 
See H.R. 5026, 111th Cong. § 215A(b)–(c) (2010).  The bill was reported out of the 
Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, but saw no further 
congressional action. See S. 1342 Bill Summary & Status, LIBRARY CONGRESS, 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:SN01342:@@@X (last visited Apr. 13, 
2014). 
 201. Exec. Order No. 13636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,739 (Feb. 19, 2013). 
 202. See id. 
 203. See id. at 11,740–41. 
 204. See id. at 11,741–42. 
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While developing an effective incentive-based voluntary 
environment sounds attractive in some ways, it is important to note 
that it may take significant time to identify appropriate incentives and 
then perfect the incentive program through periods of trial-and-error.  
Given the rapid pace at which the Smart Grid is developing205 and the 
time that has elapsed thus far without FERC adopting 
interoperability standards under EISA,206 this planning and 
implementation window may render the grid vulnerable in the 
meantime with information technology ultimately becoming so 
entrenched that achieving retroactive compliance would be extremely 
costly and time-consuming.  Through a performance audit, the 
Government Accountability Office found that while some grid 
stakeholders believed that “economic and market pressure should 
encourage manufacturers and utilities to follow voluntary standards,” 
others felt there could be gaps in compliance where there are 
significant cost considerations, or simply unfamiliarity or disinterest in 
implementation.207 
In assessing whether Smart Grid interoperability standards should 
remain free from government mandates and left to the electricity 
industry members to develop, implement, and possibly enforce, 
consideration of an existing industry-created and policed standard 
regime, such as the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard 
(PCI-DSS), can provide insight as to how fitting such a regime might 
be for the future of the Smart Grid. 
IV.  THE PROBLEMS THAT ARISE FROM VOLUNTARY 
STANDARDS: PCI-DSS AS AN INDUSTRY-DEVELOPED STANDARD 
ANALOGUE 
Some have suggested that voluntary industry-developed 
interoperability standards would allow for the effective market-driven 
evolution of the Smart Grid industry, similar to the growth of the 
Internet208 which, in the 1990s, Congress found presented a “forum for 
a true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for 
cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity” 
                                                                                                                 
 205. See infra note 246 and accompanying text. 
 206. See infra note 239 and accompanying text. 
 207. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 193. 
 208. See Eisen, supra note 172, at 55–56.  The utility industry has lobbied against 
additional federal authority to mandate cybersecurity standards, seeking instead to 
regulate itself. See Letter from Edward J. Markey, supra note 198. 
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that flourished with a minimum of government regulation.209  The 
payment card industry is another example of a sector that has, to a 
large extent, regulated itself through an industry-developed standard: 
PCI-DSS.  This standard does have enforcement elements, but is 
voluntary in the sense that it is enforced through private agreements 
rather than government mandates.210  While PCI-DSS has not been a 
complete failure, it has had its share of cybersecurity challenges.211  
PCI-DSS shows that even where there are creative industry-
developed standards and enforcement procedures, substantial 
breaches will still occur.  The risk of noncompliance is even greater 
where, as in the Smart Grid, the voluntary standard regime lacks 
private enforcement procedures. 
PCI-DSS is a security standard in the United States that applies to 
the payment card industry.  The standard is established by a 
consortium of the major credit card companies in the United States212 
and requires that merchants accepting credit card payments 
implement the standard, which is designed to provide an “actionable 
framework for developing a robust payment card data security 
process—including prevention, detection and appropriate reaction to 
security incidents.”213  Although the standard is developed 
cooperatively, each card brand has its own requirements that 
merchants accepting that brand must meet.214  It is an industry-
developed and industry-enforced standard aimed at protecting 
cardholder data215 and represents a form of “private ordering” by 
which behavior and resolution of disputes are regulated by non-
                                                                                                                 
 209. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing 
congressional findings codified at 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3) (2012) pursuant to the 
passage of the Communications Decency Act of 1996). 
 210. See Edward A. Morse & Vasant Raval, Private Ordering in Light of the Law: 
Achieving Consumer Protection Through Payment Card Security Measures, 10 
DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 213, 231 (2012). 
 211. See infra notes 218–24 and accompanying text. 
 212. The credit card consortium includes American Express, Discover Financial 
Services, JCB International, MasterCard Worldwide, and Visa, Inc. What Is the PCI 
Security Standards Council?, PCI SECURITY STANDARDS COUNCIL, 
https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/security_standards/role_of_pci_council.php (last 
visited Apr. 13, 2014). 
 213. PCI SCC Data Security Standards Overview, PCI SECURITY STANDARDS 
COUNCIL, https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/security_standards/index.php (last 
visited Apr. 13, 2014). 
 214. The payment card brands place merchants in various tier systems based on 
volume of transactions, with merchants conducting more transactions being subjected 
to more stringent security requirements. See Morse & Raval, supra note 210, at 235–
37. 
 215. See VERIZON, supra note 104, at 56. 
2014] SECURING THE SMART GRID 1389 
governmental entities.216  The standards are rooted in the economic 
benefits the payment card industry realizes from easing consumer 
fears regarding unauthorized charges that may otherwise discourage 
them from using payment cards.217 
One report analyzed breaches of organizations required to comply 
with PCI-DSS.218  It highlighted the problem of the “comparative 
mindset” in implementing an information technology security 
strategy: organizations rationalize that “being just slightly better than 
others also somehow equates to being secure.”219  Where there is total 
freedom, i.e., in the absence of mandatory standards, the comparative 
mindset may result in organizations settling for especially low levels 
of security. 
The report identified three comparative mindset categories: good, 
better, and best.220  A “good” security mindset is “my security is better 
than [that of] many of my peers, but we’re still not meeting our 
compliance requirements;” a “better” mindset is “my security is 
better than [that of] most of my peers and also meets the letter of our 
compliance requirements;” the “best” mindset is “my security is 
better than [that of] most of my peers, meets the spirit of our 
compliance requirements, and evolves with the changing threat 
landscape.”221  The report found that ninety-six percent of 
organizations subject to PCI-DSS that had been breached were non-
compliant, failing to display the “better” or “best” mindsets.  The 
majority of breach victims did not even make the “good” security 
category.222  This shows that even in a system governed by an 
“extralegal mechanism with an elaborate set of processes, structures, 
and information,”223 and fine structures aimed at incentivizing security 
investment, non-compliance is still a significant issue.224  In the Smart 
Grid, the lack of enforceable penalties only amplifies these non-
compliance concerns. 
                                                                                                                 
 216. Morse & Raval, supra note 213, at 214. 
 217. See id. at 223–24 (noting that payment card firms offer consumers more 
protection than is mandated under federal law, with “[s]elf-interest produc[ing] this 
result: if consumer fears regarding unauthorized charges induce them not to use their 
cards, the payment card industry makes no profits”). 
 218. See VERIZON, supra note 104, at 56–60. 
 219. See id. at 56. 
 220. Id. 
 221. See id. 
 222. See id. 
 223. Morse & Ravel, supra note 210, at 237. 
 224. See VERIZON, supra note 104, at 2. 
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Private ordering without significant government intervention may 
be appropriate in some circumstances.  Maybe there is a gap in 
technical expertise between private businesses and public regulators 
that would render public efforts to intervene critically uninformed 
and ineffective.  As in the case of PCI-DSS, it might be that industry 
standards imposed through contracts can be sufficiently driven by 
economic incentives.225  Perhaps there is a greater overarching 
governmental interest that justifies a more “hands-off” approach, 
such as nurturing a burgeoning forum for discourse and cultural 
development like the Internet.226 
In the Smart Grid context, however, NIST has established itself as 
an agency with significant expertise.227  Additionally, it is unclear 
whether Smart Grid industry participants will realize the same type of 
economic benefits of security so that they will privately order 
themselves, through contractual arrangements, in a manner that will 
allow for the type of industry-enforced standards present in PCI-DSS.  
Congress has expressed that it is United States policy to modernize 
the electrical grid to “maintain a reliable and secure electricity 
infrastructure,” through, in part, the “[d]ynamic optimization of grid 
operations and resources, with full cyber-security.”228  Whereas 
freedom of speech and expression were primary concerns in 
regulating the Internet, ensuring full critical infrastructure 
cybersecurity—and thus national security—should be a primary 
concern in the Smart Grid. 
V.  SHAPING A SOLUTION 
Private ordering is not a strong option for the Smart Grid because 
there is a weak “expertise gap” argument, uncertain economic 
incentives for implementing interoperability security, and a 
congressional commitment to obtaining full Smart Grid cybersecurity.  
Part V.A demonstrates that the inadequacy of the current system, the 
high stakes involved, and the expertise and experience of NIST 
render federal mandatory enforceable standards governing the 
communication of information in the Smart Grid the most 
appropriate response to ensure Smart Grid cybersecurity.  Part V.B 
explains why NIST is the appropriate entity to be given the authority 
                                                                                                                 
 225. See supra note 217 and accompanying text. 
 226. See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 227. See infra Part V.B.2. 
 228. 42 U.S.C. § 17381(2) (2012) (emphasis added). 
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to do so, while describing what a legislative solution in this spirit 
might look like. 
A. Mandatory Federal Standards Governing Smart Grid 
Information Systems Are Necessary 
It can be argued that a blossoming industry centered on new 
technologies (e.g., the Internet) may, in some circumstances and in 
light of certain goals, be better served by an unregulated 
environment.229  Nevertheless, given that the developing Smart Grid 
industry is grounded in and developing upon the generation, 
transmission, distribution, and consumption of electricity, important 
interests are raised that render mandatory regulations more 
appropriate.230  This subpart will explore three justifications for 
mandatory federal regulation of Smart Grid information systems: (1) 
the inadequacy of the current system, (2) the high stakes involved, 
and (3) the benefits to all stakeholders of a uniform standard 
approach. 
1. The Current System for Development of Interoperability 
Standards Is Inadequate 
Currently under EISA, FERC is instructed to institute a 
rulemaking proceeding to adopt interoperability standards developed 
by NIST once FERC has determined that such standards have 
reached “sufficient consensus.”231 
This process has only been explored once when NIST submitted a 
letter to FERC on October 6, 2010, indicating that it had “identified 
five foundational families of standards as ready for consideration by 
regulators.”232  On July 19, 2011—more than nine months later—
FERC issued an order refusing to initiate a rulemaking proceeding in 
                                                                                                                 
 229. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.  Professor Joel B. Eisen has 
suggested that allowing the Smart Grid to evolve in a manner similar to the Internet 
would “yield better results than trying to dictate mandatory standards today.” See 
Eisen, supra note 172, at 56. 
 230. Cf. NIST GUIDELINES VOL. 1, supra note 38, at 76 (“Power system operations 
pose many security challenges that are different from most other industries.  For 
example, the Internet is different from the power system operations environment.  In 
particular, there are strict performance and reliability requirements that are needed 
by power system operations.”). 
 231. See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
 232. Letter from George Arnold, Nat’l Coordinator, Smart Grid Interoperability, 
to Jon Wellinghoff, Chairman, Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n (Oct. 6, 2010), 
available at http://www.nist.gov/public_affairs/releases/upload/FERC-letter-10-6-
2010.pdf. 
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connection with these five families of standards.233  Ironically, FERC 
cited concerns that the proposed cybersecurity standards may lead to 
cybersecurity deficiencies.234  FERC explained that while, at the time 
of the order, the “NIST interoperability framework process” was the 
“best vehicle for developing smart grid interoperability standards,” 
certain aspects of that process were not in place at the time the 
proposed standards were being developed,235 which contributed to the 
finding of insufficient consensus.  The order concluded by giving 
NIST and SGIP supportive praise, encouraging “utilities, smart grid 
product manufacturers, regulators, and other smart grid stakeholders 
to actively participate in the NIST interoperability framework 
process.”236 
SGIP responded to FERC’s decision by stating that it 
“appreciate[d]” FERC’s acknowledgment of SGIP’s value,237 and 
George Arnold, the Smart Grid National Coordinator for NIST, 
stated that NIST supported FERC’s order.238  Despite NIST and 
SGIP’s continuing development of impressive work product aimed at 
encouraging Smart Grid cybersecurity, the EISA rulemaking 
procedure has not been pursued again since it failed in July 2011.  
Thus, in the almost six years since EISA created this interagency 
coordination procedure, FERC has not promulgated any 
interoperability standards or protocols, despite projections that Smart 
Meters will be installed in over half the nation’s homes by 2015.239 
Even if rules had been established, it is unclear from the language 
of EISA what enforcement tools FERC would have had at its disposal 
to enforce them.  FERC has reinforced the enforcement predicament 
by issuing a notice indicating that it did not interpret EISA as 
                                                                                                                 
 233. See FERC Order on Smart Grid Interoperability Standards, supra note 183. 
 234. FERC explained that the standards were not adopted in part because 
“[c]ommenters were nearly unanimous” in their opposition to the standards, “citing 
concerns with cyber security deficiencies and potential unintended consequences 
from premature adoption of individual standards.” Id. at 5. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. at 7. 
 237. See FERC Will Not Adopt Five NIST-Recommended Smart Grid Standards, 
ELECTRIC LIGHT & POWER (July 27, 2011), http://www.elp.com/articles/2011/07/ferc-
will-not-adopt-five-nist-recommended-smart-grid-standards-.html. 
 238. Mr. Arnold stated that the order was “consistent with NIST’s public 
comments to the commission that it can send appropriate signals to the marketplace 
by recommending use of the NIST framework and that it would be impractical and 
unnecessary for the commission to adopt individual interoperability standards.” 
Michael Bates, FERC Decision Leaves Grid Interoperability Standards in Limbo, 
RENEW GRID (July 21, 2011), http://www.renewgridmag.com/e107_plugins/content/ 
content.php?content.7062. 
 239. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
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granting it the authority to promulgate enforceable mandatory 
standards, meaning that, under the existing regime, FERC would 
have to first reinterpret its own authority, which could prove 
challenging.240 
Given that SGIP requires a seventy-five percent approval rate 
before adding an interoperability standard to its Catalog of 
Standards,241 to also require a finding of undefined “sufficient 
consensus” by FERC after SGIP has blessed the standard by such a 
significant supermajority of diverse Smart Grid stakeholders242 can 
take a long time, is redundant, and is ultimately a very high barrier to 
the promulgation of interoperability standards. 
The push for adoption of voluntary standards often relies upon the 
“hortatory ability” of government agencies such as NIST, DOE, and 
FERC in convincing stakeholders and PUCs that standards should be 
followed.243  Without mandatory enforceable requirements, the 
decision might simply come down to whether cybersecurity is a 
“reasonable and prudent” investment.244 Although the development 
of mandatory reliability standards by NERC and FERC under the 
EPAct are necessary to ensure that the critical assets of the Smart 
Grid are secured, the communications between these components 
must be secured as well.245  This goal should be accomplished through 
similarly mandatory and enforceable interoperability standards.  The 
failure to promulgate any interoperability standards since the 
inception of EISA in 2007, the absence of an express statutory grant 
of enforcement mechanisms, and the redundancy of a double-
consensus system involving undefined requirements (e.g., “sufficient 
consensus”) indicate an unacceptable level of inactivity in a 
burgeoning industry,246  given the high stakes. 
                                                                                                                 
 240. See supra notes 176–77 and accompanying text. 
 241. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
 242. For a description of SGIP participants, see supra note 173 and accompanying 
text. 
 243. See Ray Gifford & Eric Gunning, The Opportunity and Peril of Smart Grid, 
11 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 128, 129 (2010). 
 244. Id. at 130. 
 245. While NERC and FERC reliability standards may aid in securing the 
components that make up the Smart Grid, “[t]he strongest adversaries are not going 
to waste time attacking a component device that is known to be a fortress.”  Instead, 
attackers will look to find weaknesses between the secure components as they speak 
to each other and communicate information. See PIKE RESEARCH, supra note 76, at 
6–7. 
 246. The Institute for Electric Efficiency found that while Smart Meters were 
installed in approximately one-in-four homes as of September 2011, their presence in 
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2. The High Stakes Nature of an Industry Based on the Nation’s 
Electric Grid Warrants Mandatory Enforceable Federal Standards 
Time is of the essence.  The deployment of technology in 
distribution-level equipment, generation facilities, utilities, and ESPs 
in the absence of interoperability standards will result in security that 
is only as strong as individual companies choose to make it.  Even if a 
company chooses to make cybersecurity a top priority, information 
may become vulnerable at some point as it travels through 
communication pathways between other less-secure entities, given the 
lack of a uniform standard by which all parties participating in that 
type of communication must abide.  Those vulnerabilities only 
proliferate as more equipment and technology is deployed in the 
absence of mandatory standards. 
Electricity is ingrained in our daily lives.247  The Department of 
Energy has stated that there is “the potential for extreme damage 
from a cyber attack”248 on the electric grid that could cause “extended 
power outages and destruction of electrical equipment.”249  It added 
that a cyber attack could be “launched through the public network 
from a remote location anywhere in the world and could be 
coordinated to attack many locations simultaneously,” and “[a]ny 
prolonged or widespread disruption of energy supplies could produce 
devastating human and economic consequences.”250  Consistent with 
the fact that we are dependent on electricity in virtually all aspects of 
our lives, a 2012 report prepared by industry experts assembled by the 
National Research Council stated that it is “no stretch of the 
imagination” to think that a “systematically designed and executed 
terrorist attack” could entail costs of hundreds of billions of dollars.251  
                                                                                                                 
over half of the nation’s households is expected by 2015. See INST. FOR ELEC. 
EFFICIENCY, supra note 44. 
 247. See U.S.-CAN. POWER SYS. OUTAGE TASK FORCE, supra note 19, at 5 (noting 
that “[m]odern society has come to depend on reliable electricity as an essential 
resource for national security; health and welfare; communications; finance; 
transportation; food and water supply; heating, cooling, and lighting; computers and 
electronics; commercial enterprise; and even entertainment and leisure”). 
 248. See OFFICE OF ELEC. DELIVERY & ENERGY RELIABILITY, supra note 53, at 3. 
 249. Id. at 1. 
 250. Id. 
 251. COMM. ON ENHANCING THE ROBUSTNESS & RESILIENCE OF FUTURE ELEC. 
TRANSMISSION & DISTRIBUTION IN THE U.S. TO TERRORIST ATTACK ET AL., 
TERRORISM AND THE ELECTRIC POWER DELIVERY SYSTEM 1 (2012), available at 
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12050.  By way of comparison, the 
August 14, 2003 Northeast blackout, which affected approximately 50 million people 
and lasted up to four days in some areas, cost the United States between $4 billion 
and $10 billion. See U.S.-CAN. POWER SYS. OUTAGE TASK FORCE, supra note 19, at 1. 
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One economist who produces security-related data for the 
government estimated that if one-third of the country lost power for 
three months it would cost the economy $700 billion, equivalent to 
“40 to 50 large hurricanes striking all at once . . . . [and] greater 
economic damage than any modern economy ever suffered.”252 
Two scholars highlighted the terror that might ensue in cities 
following targeted cyber attacks.  They described the hypothetical 
scene in New York City following an anonymous attack aimed at 
disrupting the subway system, stranding subway cars in tunnels at 8:00 
a.m. on a Thursday morning.253  All systems that rely on electricity 
could be susceptible to Internet-based attacks on an enormous scale 
given the interconnected nature of the electrical grid.  Adding to 
these significant communal and national security concerns are the 
substantial personal privacy concerns previously discussed.254 
Given the inextricable integration of electricity in our daily lives, 
the rapidity with which the Smart Grid is developing, the national 
security and personal privacy and safety threats that infiltration of the 
Smart Grid through the Internet poses, and the enormity of the 
potential economic consequences, it is clear that too much is at stake 
to let Smart Grid stakeholders privately order themselves in the way 
that Internet stakeholders were permitted to.  The integrity of the 
system must be the top priority where, as here, the threats are real, 
attacks have been committed, and many parties have an interest in 
capitalizing on vulnerabilities in the system.255  This is a situation that 
calls for uniform mandated enforceable security requirements. 
3. A Uniform Federal Approach to Cybersecurity Would Benefit 
All Smart Grid Stakeholders 
State governments retained substantial regulatory control over 
utilities in the Traditional Grid.256  Accordingly, state PUCs continue 
to assert their jurisdictional claim to distribution-level activities, 
                                                                                                                 
 252. Meserve, supra note 81 (quoting economist Scott Borg). 
 253. See Susan W. Brenner & Marc D. Goodman, In Defense of Cyberterrorism: 
An Argument for Anticipating Cyber-Attacks, 2002 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 1, 14-
17.  For another example of the frightening ripple effect “layered” cyber attacks 
might have, see id. at 23–24. 
 254. See supra Part II.C. 
 255. See supra Part II.A–B. 
 256. See supra Part I.A.2 (discussing the compact between states and utilities 
through which states gained regulatory authority over utilities in the Traditional 
Grid). 
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rebuffing the idea of federal regulation.257  The resulting patchwork of 
state standards can lead to detrimental inconsistencies in an industry 
that has become interstate in nature.258  As one such interstate 
industry, the Smart Grid would be better served by uniform federal 
standards. 
First, a uniform set of mandatory interoperability standards would 
assist businesses by providing a set of rules to which innovations can 
be tailored.  This solution would allow technologies to take root and 
develop reputations and track records.  Utilities would likely be more 
comfortable adopting established technologies that have a lower 
likelihood of becoming obsolete or growing out of favor tomorrow.259  
Currently, Smart Grid businesses have likely been impacted in their 
decision-making by the uncertainty regarding interoperability 
standards.  As one research report noted, “Those who choose to plow 
ahead now risk losing their entire investment if future laws invalidate 
their approach.”260  As the industry expands, more and more decisions 
are predicated on guesswork.  The time to institute mandatory 
standards is now, rather than five years from now after there has been 
a cyber attack or new laws require the costly replacement of 
                                                                                                                 
 257. See, e.g., Bruce W. Radford, The Smart-Enough Grid, PUB. UTIL. 
FORTNIGHTLY (Aug. 2009), http://www.fortnightly.com/fortnightly/2009/08/smart-
enough-grid (citing the California PUC as insisting that the states, rather than FERC, 
should have the authority to direct electric companies whether to institute NIST-
developed standards at the distribution level); see also supra notes 180–82 and 
accompanying text. 
 258. See, e.g., Morse & Raval, supra note 210, at 244 (highlighting the issues 
presented by a patchwork of state standards in the payment card industry by noting 
that “[v]ariation in requirements among the states potentially creates significant 
problems for firms engaged in multijurisdictional business operations, which might be 
solved by uniform requirements within a federal statute”).  One scholar has noted 
that state-by-state Smart Grid solutions raise a number of issues, including 
unpredictable results and confusing implications for utilities that purvey electricity in 
more than one state. See Balough, supra note 124, at 183, 188–89.  Even some PUCs, 
despite their opposition to a perceived federal usurpation of traditional state powers, 
have recognized that a “patchwork” of state standards could be harmful, see 
Radford, supra note 257 (citing statements by the California PUC), and that 
cybersecurity may be a special area over which federal regulatory authority is be 
appropriate, see Eisen, supra note 172, at 55 n.344 (noting that Michigan Public 
Service Commission opposed enforceable federal interoperability standards, except 
in limited areas, such as cybersecurity). 
 259. Given the nature of utilities as natural monopolies and the resulting 
regulatory environment, utilities seek to earn a negotiated return on prudent capital 
investments.  Minimizing risk is a top priority, and “utilities are often slow to adopt 
new technologies that have not been extensively proven outside a laboratory.” See 
Quinn & Reed, supra note 33, at 873. 
 260. See PIKE RESEARCH, supra note 76, at 5. 
2014] SECURING THE SMART GRID 1397 
entrenched systems deemed non-compliant.  These concerns only 
become more considerable with the passage of time. 
Next, and most importantly, uniform mandatory standards would 
reduce the system vulnerabilities that result from voluntary standards 
where businesses have the option to invest a lot, a little, or nothing at 
all in cybersecurity.261  If a critical piece of information flows through 
Companies 1, 2, and 3, with Companies 1 and 3 employing strong 
security measures and Company 2 employing weak security measures, 
the weakest link causes that information to become vulnerable to 
interception despite the efforts of Companies 1 and 3.262  Uniform 
standards would help to ensure that information travels with a 
consistent level of protection throughout the Smart Grid,263 protecting 
business operations from harmful intrusion and consumers from 
unwanted exposure of private information. 
Finally, federal mandatory standards applicable to all Smart Grid 
stakeholders would provide certainty to an industry in which key 
players are risk-averse (i.e., electric utilities) by providing a firm 
footing upon which technologies can be built with a focused aim 
towards compliance.  Creating uniform standards throughout the 
system would help to ensure fairness and reduce the likelihood that 
malicious parties would intercept information or access critical 
systems by exploiting a weak point in the network. 
B. NIST Should Be Given Statutory Responsibility and 
Authority to Establish Mandatory Federal Standards that Apply 
to All Smart Grid Participants 
A legislative solution reconfiguring and redefining responsibilities 
in a manner that removes FERC from the process and grants NIST 
                                                                                                                 
 261. See generally supra Parts III.B, IV. 
 262. See, e.g., PIKE RESEARCH, supra note 76, at 6–7 (noting that “[s]ecurity is only 
as strong as its weakest link and the best attackers know instinctively to look for that 
weak link,” “[t]he best encryption algorithm in the world is useless if key distribution 
is not adequately secured,” and “sophisticated attackers will look for holes in 
between secure components—things that architecture would address”). 
 263. In explaining the rationale behind establishing a uniform approach to securing 
information in the federal system under its Federal Information Security 
Management Act powers, NIST stated that “[a] common foundation for information 
security will provide the Civil, Defense, and Intelligence sectors of the federal 
government and their support contractors, more cost-effective and consistent ways to 
manage information security-related risk to organizational operations and assets, 
individuals, other organizations, and the Nation.” NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & 
TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF COMM., NIST SPECIAL PUBLICATION 800-53, SECURITY AND 
PRIVACY CONTROLS FOR FEDERAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS, at 
vii (2013). 
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the authority to institute mandatory enforceable interoperability 
standards for all Smart Grid participants would require two essential 
determinations: (1) that federal regulatory jurisdiction in this manner 
is constitutional, and (2) that NIST is the appropriate federal entity to 
promulgate these standards. Several substantive and logistical 
considerations are also important to such a solution, including 
enforcement authority, industry involvement, compliance 
certification, and the ability of the standards to evolve over time. 
1. Federal Jurisdiction Over All Smart Grid Participants is 
Appropriate 
Although much of the regulation in the Traditional Grid was 
performed by state PUCs as part of the natural monopoly “compact” 
with utility companies,264 the expansion of interstate transmission of 
electricity has substantially increased the reach of federal regulatory 
jurisdiction.265  The Supreme Court has held that “any electricity that 
enters the grid immediately becomes a part of a vast pool of energy 
that is constantly moving in interstate commerce.”266  This modern 
understanding of the physical properties of electricity flowing in an 
interstate electrical grid counters the outdated perception that 
electricity provision is a localized operation best regulated by 
individual states.267  Rather, it suggests that broader federal regulatory 
jurisdiction may be appropriate. 
State PUCs have opposed FERC interpreting its authority under 
EISA to extend to “all electric power facilities and devices with smart 
grid features, including those at the local distribution level and those 
                                                                                                                 
 264. See supra notes 33–37 and accompanying text.  The Federal Power Act 
originally granted FERC jurisdiction over wholesale sales of electricity in interstate 
commerce and interstate electric transmission, while state PUCs reserved jurisdiction 
over retail electric sales, local distribution, and the siting of power plants and 
transmission lines. See Wokutch, supra note 40, at 545. 
 265. See Brief Amicus Curiae of Electrical Engineers, Energy Economists & 
Physicists in Support of Respondents in No. 00-568 at 3, New York v. Fed. Energy 
Regulatory Comm’n, 535 U.S. 1 (2002) (Nos. 00-568, 00-809) (explaining that while 
interstate electrical networks and transmissions were rare in 1935, today, “every high-
voltage transmission line in the continental U.S. (outside Texas) is wired into one of 
the two vast interstate grids,” causing the electricity transmission system to grow 
“away from the state regulatory territory defined by the FPA and grow[] into federal 
territory”). 
 266. New York, 535 U.S. at 7. 
 267. See supra Part I.A.2 (discussing the compact between utilities and states that 
grant states substantial regulatory control over utilities in exchange for permitting 
utilities regional monopolies). 
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used directly by retail customers.”268  As one scholar notes, PUCs 
viewed these assertions as “throwing down the jurisdictional 
gauntlet” and an “unwarranted interference” with their authority to 
implement standards for distribution-level projects.269 
However, cybersecurity is a trait uniquely integral to this new 
Smart Grid, with little history in the Traditional Grid.270  It is a 
twenty-first century concern that has national security and privacy 
implications linked to new technologies.  NIST found that most states 
had “little or no documentation available” for review by the Cyber 
Security Working Group’s Privacy Subgroup.271  Even some PUCs, 
despite their general opposition to federal intervention, have 
recognized that cybersecurity may be a special area over which 
federal regulatory authority is appropriate.272 
In light of the highly interconnected, interstate nature of the 
electricity industry that has been acknowledged by the Supreme 
Court in New York v. FERC, congressional legislation granting top-
to-bottom federal regulatory authority over the narrow area of Smart 
Grid cybersecurity is likely justified under the Constitution’s 
Commerce Clause.273  The Supreme Court has held that where there 
is a clear interstate market that is within the federal government’s 
authority to regulate and can be substantially affected by intrastate 
commercial activity, the intrastate activity can be federally regulated 
under the Commerce Clause.274  Smart Grid businesses are engaged in 
                                                                                                                 
 268. Smart Grid Policy, 74 Fed. Reg. 37,098, 37,101 (July 27, 2009).  FERC explains 
that it so interprets its jurisdiction because “Congress [did] not exclude from the 
scope of EISA 1305(d) facilities used in local distribution, or otherwise limit [FERC] 
authority to approve standards.” Id. 
 269. See Eisen, supra note 172, at 56 n.237; see also Radford, supra note 257. 
 270. Historically, electric meter readings were taken in person, showed lump-sum 
longer-term energy usage (as opposed to appliance-specific usage in the Smart Grid), 
and were not shared in ways anticipated in the Smart Grid.  Therefore, energy 
consumption patterns were not a matter that rose to public concern. See NIST 
GUIDELINES VOL. 2, supra note 42, at 9. 
 271. See id. 
 272. See Eisen, supra note 172, at 55 n.344 (discussing Michigan Public Service 
Commission’s opposition to enforceable federal standards, except in limited areas, 
such as cybersecurity). 
 273. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 274. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17–18 (2005) (holding that the “purely 
intrastate” activity of growing marijuana for personal use could be federally 
regulated since Congress rationally concluded that failure to so regulate would 
undercut the regulation of an interstate market); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 
549, 560–61 (1995) (holding that the regulated intrastate activity must be an economic 
activity that substantially affects interstate commerce); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 
111, 124 (1942) (holding that the intrastate activity of growing wheat for personal 
consumption may be federally regulated since Congress could have properly 
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commercial activity and their cybersecurity choices could clearly have 
an impact on the stability of interstate power grids, the national 
economy, and national security—impacts that could all substantially 
affect interstate commerce.275 
FERC conveyed its understanding that, under EISA, Congress 
gave FERC this type of comprehensive regulatory jurisdiction that 
did not end at the traditional border between interstate transmission 
and local distribution.276  Congress should grant NIST similar 
authority to regulate cybersecurity amongst all Smart Grid 
participants, which has the support of both law and logic, as NIST is 
the agency with the expertise and experience to properly address 
these cybersecurity issues. 
2. Proposed Legislative Action: NIST Should Be Granted the 
Authority to Issue Mandatory Enforceable Interoperability Standards 
NIST has developed the expertise and experience necessary to 
issue uniform, mandatory, enforceable federal interoperability 
standards for Smart Grid participants through its development of 
Smart Grid work product under EISA and its regulation of federal 
information systems under the Federal Information Security 
Management Act of 2002 (FISMA).277  NIST should be given, by 
statute, the responsibility and authority to issue mandatory 
interoperability standards for all Smart Grid participants.  Despite the 
failure of legislation aimed at enhancing Smart Grid cybersecurity 
primarily by expanding FERC’s authority to unilaterally institute 
mandatory reliability standards under FPA, the prevalence of 
cybersecurity legislation in both Houses indicates that the seriousness 
                                                                                                                 
considered that such activity could have a substantial effect on its effort to regulate 
an interstate market). 
 275. See supra notes 247–54 and accompanying text for a discussion of these 
impacts. 
 276. Congress authorized FERC to institute rulemaking proceedings to adopt 
standards and protocols “in interstate transmission of electric power, and regional 
and wholesale electricity markets.” 42 U.S.C. § 17385(d) (2012) (emphasis added).  It 
seems clear from the language of the statute that Congress granted federal 
jurisdictional authority beyond the traditional interstate transmission line.  FERC so 
interpreted this language, finding its EISA authority applicable to “all electric power 
facilities and devices with smart grid features, including those at the local distribution 
level and those used directly by retail customers.” Smart Grid Policy, 74 Fed. Reg. 
37,098, 37,101 (July 27, 2009). 
 277. Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-347, 116 
Stat. 2899 (portions most relevant to this note codified as amended in sections of 40 
& 44 U.S.C.). 
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of this issue is entering the forefront of congressional consciousness.278  
A bill that focuses on interoperability standards, places sufficient 
authority in the hands of the appropriate agency with substantial 
experience to draw upon immediately, and emphasizes how all 
stakeholders would ultimately benefit from a uniform federal 
standard279 might garner sufficient support in both Houses unlike 
other legislation, like the GRID Act.280 
The substantial expertise and competence that NIST has developed 
and demonstrated while performing its duty under EISA has certainly 
been noticed.  Pike Research, a global clean technology market 
research and consulting firm, noted in a 2011 report that a “number of 
well-written guidelines include the three-volume U.S. NIST 
Interagency Report . . . which covers smart grid cyber security 
strategy, architecture, high-level requirements, and data privacy.”281  
However, the report notes that “[n]one of those guidelines is an 
enforceable standard,” and that “[t]his lack of enforceable 
requirements leads to a scene of mass chaos in utility cyber 
security.”282  Many utilities, the report posits, “will only invest in cyber 
security when financial punishment for not investing is threatened.”283 
Pursuant to EISA, NIST has made great progress in identifying the 
fundamental building blocks of Smart Grid communication systems 
and how they might be secured.284  NIST’s “Logical Reference 
Model” (LRM)285 is a “composite high-level view of the actors within 
each of the Smart Grid domains.”286  The model identifies key actors 
in each domain, providing a title and description for each,287 as well as 
the unique communication paths between those actors, referred to as 
                                                                                                                 
 278. See supra Part III.C. 
 279. See supra Part V.A.3. 
 280. See supra Part III.C. 
 281. See PIKE RESEARCH, supra note 76, at 5. 
 282. Id.; see also DOLEZILEK & HUSSEY, supra note 148, at 5 (noting that “NIST 
does not have authority to require compliance with NISTIR 7628, and indeed, the 
document was not written to facilitate compliance enforcement”). 
 283. See PIKE RESEARCH, supra note 76, at 5. 
 284. See NIST FRAMEWORK RELEASE 1.0, supra note 54, at 8. NIST emphasized 
the need for a “common understanding of [the Smart Grid’s] major building blocks 
and how they interrelate.” Id.  To enable this understanding, NIST developed a 
“conceptual architectural reference model” as a means to “analyze use cases, identify 
interfaces for which interoperability standards are needed, and to facilitate 
development of a cyber security strategy.” Id. 
 285. See NIST GUIDELINES VOL. 1, supra note 38, at 17. 
 286. Actors are devices, computer systems, software programs, or the individuals 
or organizations that participate in the Smart Grid.  They are needed to transmit, 
store, edit, and process information in the Smart Grid. See id. at 14. 
 287. See id. at 18–24. 
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“logical interfaces.”288  Each logical interface is categorized based on 
the Smart Grid communication process of which it is a part.289  
Graphical depictions of each category show actors involved in that 
category and the discrete logical interfaces between them.  These 
visual depictions are accompanied by a legend that indicates 
important security considerations relevant to the particular 
category.290  Having identified and analyzed these fundamental 
communication building blocks, NIST can regulate from a position of 
substantive knowledge in setting security requirements for Smart 
Grid communications with a focus on these fundamental blocks, 
allowing for a regulatory system that is applicable to diverse business 
models. 
In determining how to convey its requirements and guide regulated 
entities, NIST could draw on its experience regulating federal 
information systems under FISMA.  NIST has developed an approach 
under FISMA by which two primary types of publications instruct 
regulated entities: (1) Federal Information Processing Standard 
(FIPS) publications,291 and (2) Special Publications (SPs).  Although 
there are many FIPS publications and SPs, three are vital to the 
regulatory framework: (1) FIPS PUB 199 sets forth mandatory 
standards for categorizing information and information systems,292 (2) 
FIPS PUB 200 establishes mandatory minimum information security 
requirements for information and information systems in each 
category,293 and (3) SP 800-53 recommends ways to achieve 
                                                                                                                 
 288. The logical interfaces are uniquely identified using the format UXX, where U 
standards for universal and XX is replaced by the specific interface number. See id. at 
14, 17. 
 289. For example, the LRM identifies eleven logical interfaces that fall into 
“Interface Category 1” which covers interfaces “between control systems and 
equipment with high availability, and with compute and/or bandwidth constraints,” 
such as communications between transmission SCADA and substation equipment, 
distribution SCADA and substation and pole-top equipment, or SCADA and the 
power plant. See id. at 27–29. 
 290. For example, several important security considerations for Interface Category 
1 include “User Identification and Authentication,” “Denial-of-Service Protection,” 
and “Communication Confidentiality.” See id. at 33. 
 291. FIPS publications are approved by the Secretary of Commerce and must be 
complied with for federal information systems under the Federal Information 
Security Management Act of 2002. See 40 U.S.C. § 11331(b)(1)(B)–(C) (2012). 
 292. COMPUTER SEC. DIV., NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., FIPS PUB 199, 
STANDARDS FOR SECURITY CATEGORIZATION OF FEDERAL INFORMATION AND 
INFORMATION SYSTEMS (2004), available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/ 
fips199/FIPS-PUB-199-final.pdf. 
 293. COMPUTER SEC. DIV., NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., FIPS PUB 200, 
MINIMUM SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR FEDERAL INFORMATION AND INFORMATION 
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compliance.294  NIST could draw upon these publications and 
experiences in establishing mandatory minimum cybersecurity 
standards295 and providing useful guidance to the Smart Grid 
industry.296 
In addition to granting NIST the authority to develop and issue 
these standards, several considerations are important for potential 
legislation.  An enforcement authority provision would be necessary 
to reinforce the mandatory nature of the standards.  Other elements 
that should also be considered for incorporation into proposed 
legislation include the involvement of industry members, compliance 
certification and possible “safe harbor” implications, and the ability 
of the mandatory standards to evolve. 
Potential legislation should grant a suitable entity enforcement 
authority; perhaps similar to the authority granted the ERO for the 
enforcement of reliability standards promulgated under the EPAct.297  
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) might be an appropriate 
enforcement entity in light of its recent enforcement proceedings 
aimed at holding companies responsible for cybersecurity 
vulnerabilities in their systems as constituting “unfair and deceptive 
practices.”298  Some have displayed concern over the FTC’s 
“willingness to dictate cybersecurity standards absent any regulatory 
or legislative guidance regarding the scope, nature, or technical 
details of those standards.”299  As it pertains to the Smart Grid, 
mandatory enforceable standards developed by NIST would fill this 
legislative/regulatory void, allowing NIST the ability to focus on one 
of its core competencies—standards development—while the FTC 
exercises its enforcement expertise in reliance upon the NIST 
standards. 
                                                                                                                 
SYSTEMS (2006), available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips200/FIPS-200-
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proceeding initiated by the FTC against HTC America); Jonathan T. Rubens, So 
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Industry can, and perhaps should, be involved in the standards 
development process.  In the reliability sphere, FERC relies upon 
NERC, an organization representing a broad array of Smart Grid 
stakeholders,300 to develop mandatory standards.  In the 
interoperability sphere, legislation could either allow or require NIST 
to incorporate contributions by a representative group (perhaps 
SGIP301) in developing its mandatory standards to ensure that 
stakeholders are active participants in the process without unduly 
slowing it down.302  The potential legislation could then grant NIST 
the responsibility of submitting the interoperability standards for 
public comment and promulgation by the Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget, in consultation with the Secretary of 
Homeland Security, similar to the promulgation procedure 
established under FISMA.303 
NIST has recently completed “Phase 3” (the final phase) of its 
“Plan for Interoperability Standards,” which entailed developing a 
framework for testing and certification of how standards are 
implemented in Smart Grid devices, systems, and processes.304  A 
certification system would support the integration of the mandatory 
standards proposed in this Note, possibly giving rise to a statutory 
“safe harbor” from certain liability for certified compliant businesses, 
similar to that which is utilized in state regulation of the payment card 
industry.305 
                                                                                                                 
 300. See supra note 158 and accompanying text (discussing the representative 
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Any proposed or potential legislation should also recognize that 
interoperability standards need to be capable of evolving over time to 
address new challenges that arise.306  There should be allowance for 
incremental alterations to regulatory catalogs of standards so that the 
standards can grow with technologies, rather than “preserve 
technologies in amber, making them potentially obsolete later.”307 
CONCLUSION 
The Smart Grid offers a number of benefits in the areas of 
environmental consciousness, energy reliability and cost savings, and 
new business opportunities.  Despite these benefits, the transition 
from an outdated Traditional Grid to an Internet-wired Smart Grid 
presents a number of serious national security and privacy risks.  
While regulatory standards issued to protect Smart Grid reliability 
are mandatory, standards aimed at ensuring secure interoperability 
are not similarly mandated.  The stakes are too high to justify the 
current environment in which adoption of important cybersecurity 
standards remain merely voluntary.  The rapid rate at which the 
Smart Grid is developing demands immediate action to ensure its 
resistance to cyber attacks.  Legislation authorizing a federal agency 
to develop and issue mandatory enforceable interoperability 
standards would allow for a uniform, coherent approach aimed at 
consistent protection of information travelling throughout the 
complex Smart Grid network.  NIST, given its demonstrated expertise 
in the Smart Grid arena and its experience issuing mandatory 
standards for federal information systems under FISMA, is the 
appropriate entity to be given the authority and responsibility to 
develop and issue these crucial standards.  Such legislative action 
would help to safeguard the security of the United States and the 
privacy of its citizens by holding participants in this industry 
accountable for their dedication to cybersecurity, while also providing 
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them with the sense of regulatory stability necessary for an 
unwavering commitment to future innovation. 
